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NEW MEXICO'S WARTIME FOOD PROBLEMS,
1917-1918: A CASE STUDY IN EMERGENCY
ADMINISTRATION
By GEORGE WINS·TON SMITH
(Concluded)

IV.

FOOD R;EGULATIONS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT .

While propaganda appeals besought the consumer to
lend support to food-saving, the food administration grudgingly gave compulsion a place in its proposals for wartime
stabilization. Soon after he received authorization in the
Lever Act, Herbert Hoover took steps to remove forcibly the
speculative profits which already had., begun to creep into
sales of grain and ·flour. At first restricting his orders to
millers of wheat and rye, he directed them to secure licenses
from the food administration. All licensees then had to
disclose in frequent reports their average margins~ of profit.
In determining what was a reasonable profit, the standard .
usually taken was the average pre-war normal profit of the
business under free competitive conditi'ons. 1 Before the end
of September, 1917, suga.r refiners were tied to the licensing
regulations. And a proclamation of President Wilson, dated
October 8, brought in a multitude of trading groups: elevators, warehouses, importers, millers, manufacturers., and
distributors of all kinds of grain, beans, cottonseed, fresh
fruit, vegetables, and many others. Exempted were those
retailers whose gross sales of food commodities were not
over $100,000 per year, and millers whose establishments
1.

Mullendore, 127, 206.
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had a capacity under seventy-five barrels per day. 2 After
awhile bakers had to get licenses if they had a monthly
consumption of more than three barrels of flour. 3 Dealers
in poultry and eggs were licensed, and, on February 15,
1918, were forbidden to s.ell hens until April 30 so that there
might be an increase in egg production. 4 Toward the end,
the far.:.reaching influence of licensing extended to farm
implement dealers, who had to get their permits in the summer of 1918.5
In New Mexico there was a considerable delay before
the state food administration was able to put the licensing
system into operation. That, however, was not due to any
willingness oh the part of Administrator Ely to ig'nore unfair trading practices. For, being somewhat influenced by
the muckraking urge of the "progressive" era in politics,
he was soon complaining loudly to food administration officials in Washington about instances of hoarding and profiteering. 6 Particular objects of his ire were the small retailers
and jobbers who siphoned off large profits when they 'mar-'
keted the farmers'· produce. · The farmer, Ely protested,
not only received less than his due, but he paid more than
he should for shipping crates, oil for his pump~ng plant,
hardware, groceries, and all of his other necessities. 7 As
a remedy,, Ely suggested the advisability of bringing the
militant Farmers Alliance into New Mexico, and hinted that
he would go as far as Hoover would allow him in organizing
community buying and selling groups. A reply from Wash-.
ington discouraged any such radical activities, although it
s.uggested that a community market system used successfully in Quincy, Massachusetts, might be tried in handling
certain products.. 8 Dutifully, Ely laid aside any plans he
might have had for consumer and producer cooperatives.
2. Ibid., 195-196, 216-217.
8. Santa Fe New Me.,ican, January 31, 1918.
4. Ibid., February 15, 1918.
·
5. United States Food Administration, Washington, D: C., to Ralph C. Ely, Santa
Fe, June 12, 1918 (copy), FA6HA3-3345.
·
'
6. Id. to id., October 20, 1917 (copy), FA6HA2-3194 ;. [Ralph C. Ely], Santa Fe,
to United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C., December 26, 1917, ibid.
7•. Id., to Herbert Hoover, Washington, D. C., October 8, 1917, ibid.
8. United States Food Administration, Washington, D. ·c., to Ralph C. Ely,
Santa Fe, October 15, 1917, (COPY), ibid.
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His administration already was fighting for its life against
the attacks of hostile merchants and politicians. Discretion
would seem to· have. been his only course, so he stressed
conservation propaganda, and quietly sought to discourage
among New Mexican distributors the practice of advertising
special prices on sugar and flour. Nevertheless, by December it was generally thought that hoarding was bringing
about a shortage of 'sugar; an increased demand for flour
in
wooden barrels had an· ominous meaning, while salt,
.
matches, and other staples began to disappear from the
markets. 9 In fact, the woman's auxiliary of the state Council of Defense went so far as to send representations to
Herbert Hoover· requesting that ration cards be issued for
those commodities that were scarce. 10 In reply, the federal
food administrator's office left no doubt· about Hoover's
distaste for ration cards. It declared: " . . . He [Hoover]
does not feel that the time has come to use ration cards and·
sincerely hopes that conditions will not arise to ma:ke this
necessary." 11 Already the food administration, in addition
to licensing, was creating a tight network of regulations to
limit copsumer consumption, cut down speculative :profits,.
and stabilize prices. Ration cards could accomplish no
more.
In New Mexico some of the most debatable restrictions
dealt with wheat and flour, and brought business men within
the sphere of still another war agency, the Fede·ral food
administration's United States Grain Corporation. Directed
by Julius H. Barnes it endeavored to eliminate speculative
practices in grain transactions by placing itself, like a great
trading colossus, astride the paths· of commerce. It bought
wheat from the producers at a relatively high but stable
price; it stored grain, sold it to millers, and regulated all
other phases of the business. 12 Every elevator· and mill
'
licensed by the food administration had to abide by a number

.

'
9. Santa Fe New Meo:ica11-, January 3, 1918.
10. Deane H. Lindsey, Santa Fe, to Herbert Hoover, Washington, D. C., De<lember 19, 1917, FA6HA2-3193.
11. United States Food Administration, Washington,. D. C., to Mrs. W. E.
Lindsey, Santa Fe, December 28, 1917 (copy), ibid.
12. Mullendore, 130.
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of basic rules : there could be no arbitrarily increased
charges for services, wheat could be stored for no longer
than thirty days, and there should be no contracts for the
sale of flour on orders for delivery more than thirty days
in advance of the sale date. Profit margins also were fixed:
millers could make only twenty-five cents per barrel on flour,
and they had to limit themselves to fifty cents per ton on
livestock feed. Nor were they allowed to pay more for
wheat than the fair price·set by the government. 13 Putting
the pieces of the puzzle together, it is apparent that they
made a pattern of restrictions designed to prevent congestion in the lines of commerce, to keep wheat and flour flowing smoothly from producer to consumer, and to prevent;
hoarders from jamming the currents of trade with snags of
self-interest. That there was a well-established chain of
authority is seen in the responsibility of the licensee to the .
food administration; below the licensees there were unlicensed dealers and consumers who, the licensed miller had
to make certain,. did not get more than enough flour for
normal sixty day requirements at one purchase, or more
than 70% of their needs of the previous year. 14 Such was
the system; it was not remarkable that within New Mexico
distinctive conditions should make for peculiar hardships in
application.
One outstanding problem in wheat and flour regulation
came from the fact,that New Mexico exported large quantities of wheat each year, but shipped in its flour from
Kansas City or other milling centers. 15 There were no large
elevators in the state at the beginning of the war. Licensed
grain and flour dealers frequently were merchants who
owned country stores, or who operated small stone mills.
Their customers were usually the more indigent laborers, and
13. Ibid., 134.
14. Ibid., 104-105, 212-213; Santa Fe New Mexican, January 28, 1918;. Questionnaire report, March 23, 1918.
15. Ibid., June 20, 1918. Ely claimed that New Mexico exported 3,000,000 bushels
of wheat in 1917, and consumed flour made from roughly 2,000,000 bushels. However,
Department of Agriculture statistics didn't agree entirely with him. The conclusion
reached from its compilation was that New Mexico's normal wheat -re<i.uirement was
'
3,166,000 bushels, and that the 1917 crop fell 952,000 bushels
short of that figure.
There was no disagreement over the fact that large amounts of New Mexican wheat
were sent out of the state, and that large amounts of flour were imported.

/
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their market depended upon their ability to undersell Kansas
City flour. Therefore, as early as September, 1917, some
of the small operators hastily came· to the conclusion that
profit-restricting regulations would drive them out of busi.:
ness. Although grinding only about seventy-five barrels of
flour each day, they had managed to make a living by charging a profit of at least twice the twenty-five cent maximum
allowed bythe regulations. But even at that they had taken
advantage of the transportation cost differential to supply
their local or nearby customers under the Kansas City flour
price. 16 They could, they argued, pay the disgruntled New
Mexican farmers more than the price of wheat guaranteed
by the Grain Corporation, grind the grain, extract their
accustomed profit, and sell to the impecunious purchaser ·at
a fair price.17 Thus, in ignoring the regulations, they would
a.ctually speed the circulation of wheat products from grower
to consumer, and defeat high living costs in the bargain!
There was another peculiarity in New Mexican conditions that complicated the task of regulating the flour and
grain trade. · That was the custom of the miller at the opening of a wheat season to collect from farmers ( especia1ly
native Indian and Mexican) nearly all the wheat they had
threshed. Some farmers, but very few, had places to store
their wheat; the rest turned their crop· over to the miller or
country merchant to pay for bills they had made the previous
winter and spring. In common parlance the miller or merchant "carried" the-farmer from season to season, and felt
that if he did not gather in the wheat. at harvest time he·
would never be able to collect his accounts. Obviously the
grain and flour rules hurt that kind cif trade. 18 What was,
for a time, even more of a problem, carose from the fact that
certain mills were licensed while others were small enough
to escape licensing; that meant communities fifty miles apart
might have a difference of as much as thirty cents a bushel
16. Charles Springer, Santa Fe, to W. S. Gifford, Washington, D. C., September
15, 1917, Council of National Defepse Papers.
17., Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, to Arthur' Pruitt,· Roswell, December 14, 1917,
(copy), FA6HA2-3193.
18. L. B. Putney and Co., Albuquerque, to Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, November
22, 1917, ibid.; Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe; to United States Food Administration,
Washington, D. C., December 5, 1917, ibid.
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in the selling price of wheat. It was, therefore, at least a
step in the direction of stabilization when, in February,
1918, all mills-large and small alike were put under the
licensing system.1 9
That did not mean, however, that the interests of the
New Mexican grain dealers and millers were forgotten. Led
by R. E. Putney, one of the most aggressive merchants in
the state and a miller of wide experience, the food administration's flour and milling division called a meeting in January, 1918, to convince over one hundred leaders of the
New Mexican grain and flour business of the advantages
and necessity of restrictions. 20 Putney also tried to improve
the opportunity to persuade New Mexicans that they should
have a milling industry that would more nearly supply their
needs for cereal foods. Instead of sending the profits outside the state to millers and to railroads which hauled both
grain and flour, why should not the flour be milled within
the' state and the profits retained there ?21 Putney
then told
.
the millers that the best answer to the question lay in· the
improved efficiency of New Mexican mills. If, to take only
one instance, New Mexico would adopt the uniform basis
for grading grain that existed elsewhere, it would be a; long
step toward standardizing both wheat growing and the milling industry of the state. · Wheat would have to come into
the mills clean and no longer would "number one wheat ·
prices be paid for number three wheat." 22
Whether because of Putney's suggestions for heightened
efficiency, or ·because of lax enforcement of the restrictive
regulations -possibly because of both -the small · mills
appeared to ·flourish during .1918. So successful were they
that an Albuquerque newspaper noted in September that
large millers were protesting at the profits made by the small
19. Questionnaire report, June 20, 1918.
20. Santa Fe New Mexican, January 23, 1918.
21. Ibid., March .16, 1918; Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to George H. Warrington,
Washington, D. C., March 18, 1918, FA6HA2-3193; Due to the efforts of the extension
serviee, at least two efficiently operated cOOperative flour mills were installed ; they
supplied large areas in Socorro and Sandoval counties. See, A. C. Cooley, "Fourth
Annual Report ·. . . December 28, 1918," pp. 61-62, Department of Agriculture ·
Archives; Questionnaire report, June 20, 1918.
22. Santa Fe New Mexican, May 29, June 5, 1918.
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producers. 23 The food administration then made something
of an attempt to tighten the restrictions by promulgating
new and still more complex rules. 24 In particular, a pledge
card system was put into operation to check abnormally
large sales of wheat mill feeds that supposedly were intended
for chicken feed but .whic~, in reality,. were for human
consumption. 25 Ely even went so far as to announce that
accounts of flour mills were to be audited by food administration accountants to learn whether or not the millers were
making excessive profits.2s
Inextricably entangled in wheat and flour control was
perhaps the most controversial of all regulations-the socalled 50/50 rule. Put in force throughout the nation on
January 28, 1918, it required that millers should not grind
wheat, and that wholesale and retail grocers: should not sell
wheat flour, unless in equal proportions, with a wheat-substi. tute cereaJ.2 7 Substitutes included: hominy, corn meal, oatmeal, rice, bu~kwheat flour, potato flour, soya bean flour,
feterita flour, tapioca, and many another. 28 Exceptions to
the rule were few, but there were a few common-sense interpretations. · For instance, a farmer who already had a
supply of home7ground corn meal might buy wheat flour if
he could present an affidavit to support his statement concerning the amount of substitute he had on, hand. 29 However, the 50/50 rule was accompanied by complementary
regulations which intensified its effect. Even .if the c.itydweller bought wheat flour and substitutes in equal amounts,
he could get only twenty-five pounds of wheat flour at one ·
time; those in rural communities could take away forty-eight
pounds at a single purchase; and ranchers, twenty-1ive miles
from the nearest market, could secure twelve pounds for
each person in their households. 30 As a climactic measure,
23. Albuquerque Morning Journal, September 11, 1918.
24. Questionnaire report, August .1, 1918.
25. Santa Fe New Me,ican, September 24, October 7, 1918.
26. Ibid., July 14, 1918.
.
27. Mrs. Sophia A. C6rdova, Truchas, to Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, March 14, 19.18,
FA6HA2-3193; Mullendore, 105.
'28. Santa Fe New Me,ican, March 25, 1918.
29. RSlph C. Ely, Santa Fe, to John w, Hallowell, Washington, D. 0., February
25, 1918, (telegram), FA6HA2-3193.
SO. Santa Fe New Me,ican, April 2, 1918.
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the food administration finally decreed that the maximum
allotment of wheat flour should be six pounds a month for
persons in most areas, with twice that much for special
occupations, as, for example, sheep-herders· in camp during
the lambing season.31
It was hard to convince people that they must use
substitutes. The most frequent complaint, and often a just
one, was that there weren't enough of them. Most of those
that were normally grown in New Mexico suffered from the
1917 drought-so much so that Ely had to lower the per-·
centage required when the 50/50 rule went into force. 32
Because there happened to be quantities of unsold potatoes,
he further weakened the rule by permitting them to be
considered substitutes for twenty days in the ratio of four
pounds to one of wheat ftour. 33 Nevertheless, that didn't
satisfy the criticism that the food administration was not
limiting the price of substitutes as it did that of wheat. 34
Ely asked for a change in the food control act so that the
food administration. might have
such power, but the answer I
•
was that corn and other coarse grains did not pass largely
through terminal markets where controls were exerted on
wheat and rye. 35 To be sure, Herbert Hoover demanded
that wholesalers should stop dealing with retailers who
could not justify with respect to costs the prices they were
charging for substitutes. The most expensive substitute, he
announced, should be at least ten percent under the quota,..
tion for wheat ftour. 36 Ely was willing to agree that many
small dealers who sold to consumers in isolated places were
likely to charge excessive prices. And, likewise, he pointed
out the objectiomible practice of avoiding substitutes
31. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to John W. Hallowell, Washington,
D. C., March
.
'
30, 1918, (telegram), FA6HA2-3194; id. to United States Food Administ!atil)n, Washington, D. C., April 5, 1918, FA6-HA2-3193.
32. I d. to id., February 1, 2, 1918, (telegrams), FA6HA2-3194. Stocks of corn on
hand, January 1, 1918 were 64,986 bushels, compared to 89,956 bushels, on January
1, 1917. See, United States Department of Agriculture Bureau of Markets Food Sur"eys (Washington, D. C., 1918) vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 3-5.
33. Questionnaire report, March 23, 1918.
34. Las Cruces Citizen, May 11, 1918; Charles Springer, Santa Fe, to George F.
Porter, Washington, D; C., December 5, 1917, Council of National Defense Papers;
Las Vegas Optic, March 2, 1918.
35. Mullendore, 289-290.
36. Santa Fe New Mexican, February 9, May 10, 1918.
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by the sale of excessive quantities of wheat ;fl.om: wholesale
on the plea that deliveries were made under contracts that
had been negotiated before enforcement of the 50/50 rule.
Although the food administration did little to make Hoover's
fiat concerning the price level of substitutes a reality, its
law department did rule that deliveries on prior contracts
were unfair practice.37
Meanwhile, some New Mexican mills began to grind
substitute flour in larger amounts, and others installed the
necessary equipment.38 On April 17, Ely was able to write
Hoover that stores of flour were so good under the 50/50
rule that shipments into New Mexico had stopped. 39 Still,
he felt compelled to admit that, if it should lower prices any,
the people would favor price-fixing by the food administration. By June, substitutes' prices were still high, although
they had begun to fall. If, Ely believed, instead of stocking
up on corn meal and then attempting to force its sale, the
merchants would have invested in several kinds of substitutes, the downward trend would have been more marked.40
But notwithstanding all defects he felt that the· 50/50 ruLe
was observed. 41 On the contrary, when the 50/50 rule was
abrogated (August, 1918), it wa.s provided that all flour
manufactured and sold had to be "liberty flour," made of
eighty percent wheat and twenty percent corn. Since under
the superseded 50/50 rule the consumer could buy his flour
and do his own mixing, the likely inference would be that
the 50/50 rule had not been completely successful.42
The 50/50 rule and numerous other regulations affected
markedly -the restaurateurs and bakers of New Mexico. To
mention one of the specialized restrictions: after February
24, 1918,
every· baker had to· use at least twenty percent of .
~

37. Ralph C. ·Ely, Santa Fe, to United States Food Administration, Washington,
D. C., January· 30, 1918, FA6HA2-3194; Law Department, United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C., to Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, January 31, 1918, (telegram
copy) , ibid.
38. -Santa Fe New Me:xi.can, February 7, 19, 1918. .
39. Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, to Herbert Hoover, Washington, D. C., April 17,
1918, FA6HA2-3193 .
. 40. Questionnaire report, Jurie 20, 1918.
41. Ibid.
42. Albuquerque Morning Journal, September 8, 1918; John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C., to Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, August 29, 1918, (copy), FA6HA3-3345.
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substitute flour in ail his products. Bread made under such
conditions could be advertised as "Victory Bread," and so
could cakes, pies, and pastry if they contained one-third sub:..
stitute flour. All wheat flour had to be bought in the ratio
of four pounds to one of substitutes; on April 14 the ratio
was raised to three to one, on September 1 it aga;in was
reduced to four to one, and on November 12 (the day after
the armistice) the requirement was canceiled.43 Before
regulations had been long enforced, Ely heard that some
bakers were reducing the size of their loaves from sixteen
.to twelve ounces without a corresponding drop in price;
as a result, the food administration set a maximum price of
'
ten cents for a twelve ounce loaf. 44 To prevent other loopholes from developing, it was set forth that hotels, restaurants, clubs, and other public eating places which· made
their own bakery goods should operate under the bake-shop
regulations. These restaurants and the like also were required to ration bread. to patrons at the rate of two ounces
per serving (about the same as in England), and to serve
no wheat products ·unless they were specifically requested
45 From April to September, 1918,
to do so by the customers.
•
they were limited to a six pound allotmentfor every ninety
meals served.4 6
Bakers, restaurant owners, and indeed all citizens' were .
interested in the sugar supply. And, in December; 1917,
Ely issued rules which prescribed that it should be sold in
small quantities. 47 Confectioners and other non-essential
v
users were given less than their accustomed quantities, but
with the promise their quotas might be raised if they would •
· use glucose, honey, and other substitutes.48 Later, however,
several causes combined to make the sugar problem more
serious. The domestic sugar beet crop, the Louisiana cane ,
output, and the supply from the West Indian islands all were
43. Mullendore, 105-106; Santa Fe New Me:oican, February .11, March 4, 5, 1918.
44. Ibid., October 7, 1918; Questionnaire report, June 20, 1918.
45. Santa Fe New Mezican, January 81, February 5, March 2, May 1, October
14, 1918.
46. Ibid., April 25, 1918.
47. Ibid., December 31, 1917.
48. Ibid., January 2, 1918.

i.

-~---------

WARTIME- FOOD PROBLEMS,
'

1917-1918

11

c

less than the estimates. Ravages- of war,_ especially the
destruction of beet sugar factories in- France and Italy, had
their effect. An ever-present factor was the large amount
of shipping needed to transport the growing American army
to France. 49 Therefore, after July 1, a more rigid control·
of distribution to all sugar users was undertaken through
rules enforced upon licensed manufacturers, wholesalers,
and retailers. All principle sugar using trades were classified into five groups. Manufacturers of candy, soft drinks,
arid similar luxury foods were lirrtited to fifty percent of
their normal consumption. Ice cream makers got seventyfive percent of their needs, while commercial canners were
granted enough for "necessary requirements." - Restaurants
and clubs were rationed on the basis of three pounds for
each ninety meals served. Similarly, three pounds (later
two pounds) monthly per person went to householders, with
an extra twenty-five pound per family allowance for homecanning.50
In contrast to the ration card systems. of other countries,
sugar certificates were the means by which the system
operated. At the outset business men were told to report
the amount of sugar they had on hand or in transit; then
their requirements (based upon their previous use ofsugar)
were tabulated, and certificates issued to the proprietors of
the numerous types of business establishments: ·grocery
stores, confectioneries, hotels, bakeries, etc. When making
a purchase, certifieates had to be given to the wholesaler in exchange for sugar. In turn the wholesaler submitted
them to the refiner who, after cancelling them, returned
them to the food administration. 51
As might be expected this complicated system of rationing did not work entirely without friction. Certainly there
was a considerable number of certificates issued. Sometimes grocers would receive certificates and then would sell
sugar to bakeries; the bakery too might receive a certificate
49.
50.
26, 1918,
51.

lbUl., Jul}' 12, 1918..

Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to John W. Hallowell, Wa.shington, D. C., August
FA6HA3-3345; A large poster: "Rules a.s to the Use and Sale of Sugar," ibid.
Mullendore, 111-112-; Questionnaire report, September 1, 1918.
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for its needs, and consequently would duplicate its supply.
Many business houses did not have adequate records of
their previous sales upon which the food administration
could base any accurate quota. 52 During July, no less than
150,000 pounds were distributed upon the presentation of
special certificates for home-canning allotments; in August,
157.,508 pounds went out in the same way. 53 Still, in spite
of these evidences of laxity, Ely lauded the loyal cooperation of the merchants which made the system generally
successful. And, in truth, it was the merchant who had to
apply limitations upon the consumers' demands.
Unlike most states, New Mexico had a printed form
which all householders had to fill out when they obtained
sugar. It read as follows :54
Certificate as to· the amount of Sugar Purchased from
-------------------------·----·----------Grocer
____________________ _:_ __________ ._________ Town
________________________ 1918

I hereby certify that I have received from the above
grocer ______ :__pounds of sugar and that this purchase does not give me more than three pounds
per person per month in my family, there being
________ persons in my household.
Purchaser.
Of course, home consumption certificates did not govern
the retailer's quota; that was set by his pre-ration sales.
The certificate signed by the housewife was simply a method
of bringing home the importance of conservation to the
individual consumer. It also made it easier for the merchant to distribute his supply among his various customers.
Conceivably, a housewife might "repeat" by signing these
certificates in various stores, but it is a tribute to the attitude
52. Ibid., August 1, 1918.
53. Ibid.; A. J. Maloy, Albuquerque, to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C.,
August 19, 1918 (telegram), FA6HA3-3345.
54. . Certificate printed on 3" x 5" slip of paper. They were first issued in July,
1918, ibid.; See also, Cecil Barnes, "Sugar Distribution to Consumers" (mime~
graphed report), FA6HC5-3686.
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of the New Mexican people that this was not generally
done. 55
Beginning August 1, all types of allotments were cut,r;e
but as new
stocks of sugar came in. and the war picture .
.
brightened, it was found possible to restore the consumer's
allowance to three pounds per month, 57 and all restrictions
were removed soon after the war ended. It is difficult to
assess the final results of sugar rationing. . Acting food
administrator, Bush, claimed in October that New Mexico
already had saved over 500,000 pounds of sugar more than
the allotment that the law gave to the state. 58 Earlier, Ely
claimed that the average consumption of sugar was not over
forty-five percent of normal, and that the sugar for canning
was only fifty or sixty percent of what generally had beer:i ·
used before then~59 On the other hand, the number of
certificates issued indicates that the food administration was
·quite liberal, and that no one must have been deprived r0f
sweet foods to any serious degree.
Hoover's food control plans had scarcely been made
public when, because in his opinion the fixing of maximum
prices had been harmful in belligerent European countries,
he promised that aside from wheat and flour he would not
attempt to fix the price of foodstuffs in the United States.~ 0
For the most part his policy followed his statement, but
before the war ended, sugar, rice, cottonseed derivatives.,
and several other products had been placed under absolute
'

55. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C.,
August 19, 1918,
ibid.;
Questionnaire report, September 1, 1918.
.
'
56. Santa Fe New Me,ican, July 27, 1918.
57. Ibid., November 1, 1918.
58. Albuquerque Morning Journal, October 7, 1918; United States Food Administration statistics are interesting in this connection.. The total certificate pounds of
sugar issued in the state were: July, 940,750; August, 1,069,644; September, 1,345,59E;
October, 1,110, 777; November, 1,230,675. All<>tments per capita were: July, 3.7 lbs.;
August, 2.5 lbs.; September, 2.5 lbs.; October, 2.5 lbs.; November, 3.4 lbs. Compa:re<l
to the per capita allotments, the per capita issues were: July, 2 lbs. ; AugUBt, 2.4 Jbs. ;
8eptember, 3 lbs.; October, 2.5 lbs.; November, 2.8 lbs. See "Sugar Certifieates
Issued in the United States, July-December, 1918," FA48HBB5-24996; Joshua Bernhardt, ·A Statistical Survey of the Sugar Industry and Trade of the United Sta,tes
([Washington], 1920), 96.
59. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C.,
April 17, 1918, FA6HA2-3194.
60. Albuquerque Morning Journal, September 8, 1917.
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price control. 61 In addition, definite margins of profit were
recommended for "middlemen," and sometimes these were
enforced by an aroused public opinion. 62
There were several reasons why it was hard to deal
with the problem of price control in New Mexico. As food
, administrator Ely was wont to point out, high prices for
grocery products were the rule in remote localities. This
was due partly to the expense of cartage over long distances.
But also it was owing to the number of transactions in
which the goods were involved before they reached the hands
of the consumer. As an illustration, some canned goods
might be sent by a wholesaler in Albuquerque to a "little
wholesaler" in Estancia, from there they would go to a
retailer in a small mountain hamlet, and then finally to the
consumer. Considering the high profits that were charged
at each stage, an exorbitant price was inevitable. Long
credits might accompany these transactions. For, according
to Ely's observation, wholesalers often competed for business not so much on the quality of goods sold or the prices
charged for them but in the credit terms which they were
able to offer. 63
Nevertheless, New Mexico grocers appeared eager to
line themselves up behind a drive for reasonable prices. By
January 15, 1918, a total of 4,175 retail grocers signed a
"Retailer's Pledge Card," by which they promised to give
consumers the benefit of fair and moderate prices. 64 A
month later the food administration's grocery division sent
blank-forms to the merchants asking them to forward the
cost and . selling price on a large number of s-taple fooq
commodities. 65 Ely wasn't so receptive to a suggestion from
federal food administration officials that he should send . a
list of housewives who would periodically report the pre-

61. Santa Fe New Mezican, October 12, 1918.
. 62. Ibid., October 9, 1918.
63. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to J. B. Clark, Washington, D. C., July 27, 1918,
FA6HA3-3345; id. to United States Food Administration: Williams, Washington; D. C.,
July 20, 1918, FA45HAA1-23232.
64. Santa Fe New Mezican, January 15, 1918.
65. M. T. Dunlavy, Santa Fe, to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. ·C., February .
26, 1918, FA6HA2-S194.
·
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vailing retail prices of food articles to Washington.66 He
was opposed also to the proposal that "fair price lists"
should be published in every community as a warning
against those grocers who garnered excessive pro:fits. 67 It
was only after the strongest pressure was brought to bear
upon him from Washington that he finally made preparations to introduce such publications. Not until August was
a beginning made in two counties ;68 even then Ely was not
convinced. The lists, of course, did not set forth inflexible
"ceiling prices." In one column there was printed the .
minimum and maximum prices which a retailer might pay
for a number of items with recognition of possible variations
in different retailers' costs due to diversity in the quality
of goods, etc. In the right-hand column of each list were
the prices that the consumer would be asked to pay. Those,
too, might differ from store to store depending upon the
retailer's overhead and other expenses. A number of items
taken from a typical price·list, published in Albuquerque on
September 12, 1918, follow :69
Commodity
Retailer pays Consumer should pay
Wheat flour
(bulk) (per lb.)
6.80
6.80
.15 over cost
Corn Flour
"
" "
6.20
9.60
.08
.08'%
Cornmeal
"
" "
6.60 ·
5.86
.07',il .08
Sugar granulated
"
" "
8.35
8.67
.09'h .10
Potatoes per pk.
8.35
,
8.60
.04
.04
Canned tomatoes standard gr. No. 2 can
.12
.16
.20
Canned corn
"
" "
" "
.15
.15
.20
Canned peas
"
,- "
" ,·
.1-1
.20
.12lh .25
Canned salmon (Alaska pink) 16 oz. No. 1 can .16 2/8
.16 2/S
.20
.25
Evaporated milk (unsweetened) 6 oz. can
.04%
.05'h
.05
.07%
Butter creamery tub. print per lb.
.50
.52
;lili
.57
Eggs (fresh), (stored) per doz. .
.60
.60
.60
.70
Lard, pure leaf (in tin) per lb.
10.24% (sic) .24'h
.3ll
Bacon sliced std. grade per lb.
.84
.46
.40
.50
Pork chops per lb.
.40 . .40
Ham smoked sliced per lb. .
.88
.86
.38
.40
Round steak per lb.
.35
· .35

That it might improve its chances for success in price
publication, the state food administration undertook to con•
vince New Mexican business men that they should abandon
long credits, and the all too frequent practice of concealing
66. United States Food Administration, Statistical Division, Washington, D. C.,
to Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, April 6, 1918, (copy), ibid.
· 67. M. T. Dunlavy, Santa Fe, to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C., January
21, 1918, ibid.; Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to . K. S.. . Clow, Washington, D. C.,
May
~ 7, 1918, FA6HA2-3193.
68. K. C. Clow, Washington, D. C., to Ralph C. EI:v, Albuquerque, Ma:v 15, 1918,
(copy), ibid.; Questionnaire report, September 1, 1918.
69. Albuquerque Morning J'ournal, September 12, 1918.
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interest payments in the high prices of the goods sold. 70
In the opinion of many merchants the arguments against
such practices were reasonable; some dealers did limit credit
to thirty days, and allowed discounts for cash payment. 71
The "cash and carry" system, however, did not become popular at the time, even though stores sometimes sharply curtailed their delivery services. 72 And the system of price
publication too was painfully slow in developing. Not until
September
did the state food administration's field secre•
tary spend much time working' on the problem with newly
appointed county administrators. 73 Even the Washington
office of the administration decided it had better send a
supervisor to help the state administrator with it, and business men from outside the state were called in to check
prices. 74 Still, for the week of October 26 only five fair
price reports were received from county price administrators.75 After all efforts had been made, A. J. Maloy of
the grocery division rather hopelessly applied to Washing- '
ton for more fair p:rice administrators' blank-reports; it was
his conclusion that perhaps the fair price administrators
had not reported because they had. mislaid completely the
blanks he had sent to them some time before that. 76 It
would seem that fair price publication, as it was practised
in New Mexico, left a great deal to be desired.
In the last analysis the effectiveness of the food administration's food saving regulations depended upon the manner
in which they were accepted. Ely was certain that although
in the beginning the New Mexican merchants had felt that
the food administration would interfere with them, they
later came around to the opinion that it helped them quite
as much as it hampered them. 77 As a matter of fact, he
7.0. Questionnaire report, September 1, 1918,
7L Ibid,
72. Ibid., June 20, 1918.
73, Ibid., October 1, 1918.
74. United States Food Administration, ·washington, D. C., to H. G. Bush,
Albuquerque, October 11, 1918, (copy), FA6HA8-3343.
75. L. F. Jaques, Washington, D. C., to id., November 8. 1918, FA45HAA4-23258.
76. A. J. Maloy, Albuquerque, to United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C., October 29, 1918, ibid.
77. Questionnaire report, June 20, 1918.
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went so far in the spring of 1918 as to give the merchants
the main burden of carrying out the regulations. In his· .
words: he made them agents of. the administration "to
enforce the rule,"· and held them "morally responsible for
deception by customers." 78 If the regulations were enforced
it was largely because of such cooperation. Reports of
licensees were submitted to his office, but he took the attitude
that it was the duty of the administration in Washingon to
review them and offer suggestions. 79 Until the summer of
1918 he revoked no licenses. On one or two occasions in th~
spring of 1918 he ~sed the press to give veiled warning to.
transgressors, but no names were published in these warn:ings and there was no blacklist. 80 Several suspected violat~
ors were called in for conferences where they were treated
in "a fatherly or brotherly sort of way." To use Ely's own .
expression: he "secured their compliance through their
promises of voluntary cooperation." 81 In the same vein,
individual letters were sent out "in many cases" with gooq
.. results. For information about complaints, the food administration usually relied upon volunteers in each community.
Traveling salesmen were enlisted as informal reporters. By
the spring of 1918, however, the administration had one
salaried inspector, and after awhile two others were added
to the staff. 82 Even then few penalties were imposed, and
it is doubtful if at times the regulatjons were consistent
enough to permit detection of violations. As late as August, ·
1918, Ely was unable to tell whether or not all subject to
the bakery regulations had secured their licenses. R,eports
by licensees appeared to be irregular, and he judged that
many failed to report at all. Yet one reason he could not
check upon them was that he knew his list of licensees was
not correct !83
Still, on occasion, Ely .was not loath to make a rather
78. Ibid., March 23, 1918; Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, to John W. Hallowell, Wash·
ington, D. C., February 27, 1918, FA6HA2-3193.
-79, Qu~tionnaire report, June 20, 1918.
80. Ibid., March 23, 1918. ·
81, Ibid., August 1, 1918:
82. Ibid., March 23, 1918.
83. Ibid., June 20, August 1, 1918.
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flashy demonstration of his authority. In late June, 1918,
'he closed a confectionery store at Deming because its proprietor, an immigrant who couldn't speak· English, made
an untrue report on sugar requirements. 84 Another time,
after trying to bring restaurant men of Albuquerque together for a conference, Ely sent the chief of police after
those who failed to appear. 85 During July, 1918, one seed
company's license was cancelled, and another firm lost its
permit temporarily but had it restored when it paid $1250
to the food administration for· distribution to 'charity. In
that case it was learned that the offender had made a profit
of more than one hundred percent on some old stocks. 86
However, what was perhaps the most highly publicized enforcement incident, proved also to be one of the most
embarrassing for certain state officials. It concerned a large
store of wheat seized by the state food administration on
the charge that the men who owned it had given no satisfactory explanation of their failure to sell at the government's ruling price. By chance the food administration
press service in Washington used the story as the subject
of a national press release which played up the point that
the defendants were two brothers of German extraction. It
made livid propaganda, but, unfortunately for harmony in
the New Mexican war effort, one of the brothers was chairman: of a county Council of Defense, and a prominent
Republican state office-holder. Charles Springer, as executive chairman of the state Council of Defense, defended the
brothers against the food administration's accusations. He
asserted that far from hoarding their wheat they previously
had offered their entire stock for distribution as seed grain
among the farmers. 87 One of the most flagrant violations
of food regulations was handled directly by Herbert Hoover.
84. Santa .Fe New Meo:ican, July 1, 1918.
85. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to McBowman (8ie) [John McE. Bowman], Washington, D. C., January 3, 1918, FA6HA2-3194.
86. Questionnaire report, September 1, 1918; United States Food Administration,
Washington,
D. C., Press Release no. . 1082, July 18, 1918, Press Releases, vol. 11.
.
.
87. Charles Springer, Santa Fe, to Arthur H. Fleming, Washington, D. C.,
April 8, 1918, Council of National Defense Papers, CND14-A2 (71') ; United States
Food Administration, Washington, D. 0., Press Release no. 778, March Z3, 1918.
Press Releases, vol. 8.
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The offender was a large inter-state seed company which did
business in both Colorado and New Mexico. Its license was
revoked for an indefinite period for unfair practice in the
pinto bean trade, and it was in effect barred from commerce
for the duration of the war. 88 In some respects. the most
interesting of all enforcement attempts related to the, trade
in ice. During the summer of 1918, a petition from consumers in Albuquerque asked the state food administration
to investigate the high prices then being charged for ice. ·
Ely acted without delay, and sent out mimeographed questionnaires to all ice-dealers in the state. Important in these
mimeographed inquiries were· compartive price schedules
for the summers of 1917 and 1918. The answers showed
that throughout the state the "ice situation" was relatively
satisfactory. Nevertheless, an extensive hearing was held
on the trade practices of a large Albuquerque ice company. 89 . ,
V. PROBLEMS OF PRODUCTION AND MARKETING '

Whatever efforts might b.e considered. essential to halt
hoarding and rising prices, the certainty remained that
increased food production would be the only real safeguard
against disaster. In spite of the drought there was, within
a month after war, began, an auspicious. beginning of
. voluntary cooperation. Farmers readily signed agreements to
increase the total acreage under cultivation. In June, 1917,
A. D. Crile of the State College proudly announced that
thirty-three and a third percent more land had been pl~nted
because of the production drive, a:nd still there were hun1 dreds of thousands of postcards going into the mails to urge
1 But the state Council
farmers to
. plant acres as yet
. untilled.
.
of Defense and other emergency agencies knew that success
depended upon seed, and so, acting with the support of a
large legislative appropriation, the council's agents began to
88. Ibid.; no. 1072, July 15, 1918, vol. 11.
89. MS. petition from the people of Albuquerque, FA132AA1-38026; "Comparative Price Schedule" (mimeographed), ibid.; "Minutes of Hearing of Southwestern
Brewery and Ice Co.," ibid.; Ralph 0. Ely, Albuquerque, to United States .Food
Administration, Washington, D. C., July 7, 1918, ibid.
1. Santa Fe New M""'ica.n. June 19, 1917.
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extend loans to those who could buy seed in no other way. 2
Notes payable to the state disbursing officer on or before
November 30, 1917, carried provisions for an interestcharge
at the rate of six percent per annum. Each loan was secured
by a mortgage on the crop, and such other security as could
be had. 3 After receiving·the note and mortgage, the financial
agent might issue the farmer an order upon the seed dealer
or distributing agency designated by the county Council of
Defense. In that way, according to incomplete statistics
gathered by the extension service, at least 161,824 pounds
of beans, 47,262 pounds of seed corn, 86,292 pounds of seed
potatoes, and 345,000 pounds of wheat were distributed in
1917.4 Most of that large amount was sold by business men
at cost, and county agricultural agents aided too by locating
seed. In Bernalillo county, 290 farmers were assisted; in
San Miguel county, 486; and in Colfax county, 372. 5
As the drought continued to parch the land during the
later growing season, some of the farmers complained that
it was unfair to make the mortgages upon other property
than crops. They believed it nothing less than simple justice
that their. notes should have c~mtained provisions for cancellation and
return to. themaker in the event of crop failure
.
not due to the fault of the farmer himsi:M. 6 But at a
conference of the Council of Defense and county agricultural
agents in the fall of 1917, it was decided that the existing
type of interest bearing note was essential to the plan, and
that it would increase the self-respect of the farmers. The
State, however, should extend the time for the payment of
seed loans when the farmer could not meet his obligations.
Local organizations, the conference felt, might be used by
the farmers but wherever possible "the farmer should be
made to feel that the State was loaning him the money and

.

2. Phil H. Lenoir, Santa Fe, to George F. Porter, Washington, D. C., May 11,
1917, (telegram), Council of National Defense Papers; Final Report of the New
Mexico Council of Defense, 21-23.
3. "Letter of Instruction Sent Each Financial Agent, Santa Fe, May 15, 1917,
from Governor" (copy), Council of National Defense Papers.
4. A. C. Cooley, Third Annual Report, p. 39.
5. Ibid., p. 38.
6. Union County War Committee, Clayton, to W. E. Lindsey, Santa Fe, May 18,
1917, in Santa Fe New Mexican. May 21, 1917.
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that the st;:tte was his greatest benefactor." 7 Some of the
farmers who had borrowed gratified the Council of Defense
by paying at least part of the principal, but many had to
extend their loans at least in part. 8
Results of the 1917 crop were mixed. Total production
figures undoubtedly broke all existing records ·for corn,
wheat, beans, and other crops. The wheat crop was approximately 900,000 torts higher than the average production of
the previous ten years. Still the crops were somewhat disappointing. In Torrance county, bean yields per acre were
no more than one-third of what had been anticipated. W. A.
Gardner, the county agent for Lincoln county, reported that
practically all the beans planted there had been lost in the
string-bean stage. ·Although the bean acreage .in Bernalillo
county was three times larger the total crop was slightly
under that of 1916.9
At first sight, 1917 agricultural prices would seem to
have been very satisfactory,l 0 but any such opinion would
have to disregard rising costs of production and the drought
conditions which reduced the per acre yield. Failure to
conquer the problem of rising living costs by the fall of 1917
did not make the farmers any more eager to survey their
drought-seared acres with complacency. Specific discontent
over the government's fixing of the price of wheat was their
n10st intense grievance. In August, Charles Springer, executive secretary of the Council of Defense, wrote a cheerful
letter to county financial agents in which he assured them
that they could begin a new campaign to encourage wheat
. acreage with the promise that the food control act recently
· passed by Congress wduld fix the minimum price of wheat
for the next year's crop at $2.00.11 What he failed to consider was that even six weeks before then wheat had been
selling in Clovis for $2.50 per bushel,1 2 and at that time the
7. Ibid., October 13, 1917.
8. "Report of th~ State County Agent Leader for the month of October, 1917,"
p. 5; Department of Agriculture Archives.
9. Ibid., pp. 1-4; Santa Fe New Mexican, December 12, 1917 (citing the Portales
Valley News.)
· 10. Ibid., October 11,.1917.
11. Ibid., August 17, 1917.
12. Ibid., July 31, 1917. ·
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staple was bringing corresp~mding prices elsewhere. By the
end of July, even at that figure, only 50,000 bushels had been
placed on the market in Curry county, with an estimated
450,000 bushels held back for higher prices. 13 In other
words, the New Mexican farmer already had felt the speculative pull of wartime economy. Consequently, when the
United States Grain Corporation fixed the "fair price" of
wheat at the Kansas. City price ($2.15) less the freight from·
New Mexico to Kansas City, the implied drop of fifty to
seventy cents a bushel from: th·e prevailing price was in the
farmers' opinion an intolerable discrimination. 14 Some of
them began to feed their wheat to horses and cattle instead ,
of shipping in other feeds. 15 Food Administrator Ely stated
the case of the New Mexican wheat growers in a letter to
. Julius H. Barnes, head of the Grain Corporation, but Barnes
refused to consider any special price adjustment, declaring
it would be disastrous "to jeopardize the general plan of
wheat price fixing because of special conditions in New r
Mexico." 16
In the face of general discontent it was rather difficult
to encourage increased planting of .winter wheat. The
Council of Defense, however, distributed red, white, and
blue posters, and urged the patriotic duty of planting large
acreage. 17 In some
areas there was, in spite of opposition
'
to the .government's price, a favorable_ response. For example, in the· Pecos Valley, there were several thousand
new acres; more winter wheat was planted in Santa Fe
county than ever before, and acreage in Dona Ana county
increased five-fold by ihe spring of 1918.18 Money for seed
again was provided by loans from the Council of Defense.
Also the ;Federal Land Bank of Wichita loaned well over
'

13. · Loc. cit.
14. Mullendore, 138, 149-151; Albuquerque Morning Joo.rmU, September 20, 1917;
Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, to United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C.,
October 10, 1917, FA6HA1-3087.
15. Charles Springer, Santa Fe, to W. S. Gifford, Washington, D. C., September .
14, 1917, (telegram), Council of National Defense Papers.
16. Santa Fe New Me:cican, September 19, 1917.
17. Ibid., August 31, 1917.
18. Ibid., December 14, 1917, April 11, ·J-une 20, 1918; Albuquerque M01"ning
Journal, September 21, 1917.
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twO. million dollars on New Mexican lands by May, 1918. 19
As a year earlier, the county agents began in January to
survey the needs for spring wheat seed. 20 In that month
too, Governor Lindsey's appeal for more production, "A '
Foreward to the People of New Mexico," held out a hope
for better weather. Heavy snow, he noted, had ended the
drought. 21
Nevertheless, dry weather, though not as bad as in
1917, continued to be a discouraging factor. By April it
had· resulted in a 'heavy abandonment of winter wheat
in
.
the eastern part of the state, and four months between
January and September sho.wed precipitation deficiencies .
. To be sure, during August some districts actually had an
excess of rain, and there beans moulded in low-lying fields;
but they were scattered areas. Wheat smut was another
menace. In· June; Department of Agriculture statistics
showed that, whereas the state had 175,000 acres in winter
wheat compared to 134,000 the year before, conditions were
sixty-eight percent of perfect compared· to seventy-five percent of average in 1917.22 Nor did New Mexicanfarmers
feel any better about the general price policy; there was no
major alteration in it, although in June, when freight rates
were raised, wheat prices were boosted a few cents per
bushel to. compensate for the change. 23 Yet, by and large,
disaster was averted when, in the end, the crop yields were
not so bad after all. Beans remained about the same as in
1917, while corn was up 642,000 bushels, and wheat was one
third higher. 24 Ironically enough, just as the crops came in,
New Mexican farmers were faced with new problems
brought by the end of the war. Some farmers found credit
tight when they attempted to finance their winter wheat
'

19. Santa Fe New Mexican, May 30, 1918.
2Q. A. C. Cooley, Fourth Annual Report, pp. 31-32; "Report of the State County
Agent Leader .. ; January, 1918," passim, Department of Agriculture Archives.
21. Deming Headlight, February 8, 1918.
22. Santa Fe New Mea;ican, June 12, 1918; Albuquerque Morning Jo'IJ:rnol,
September 12, 1918; Rupert L. Stewart, State College, to Ralph· C. Ely, Albuquerque,
June 14, 1918, FA132AA1-38029.
23. A. C. Cooley, Fourth Annual Report, p. 32; Santa Fe New Mea;ican, June
22, 1918.
24. Ibid., Oetober 12, 1918.
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planting in the fall of 1918. Julius H. Barnes of the Grain
Corporation warned that if any new supplies of grain were
opened it would necessitate congressional appropriations to
make effective the guaranteed price of wheat, and that
growers who followed their usual practice of holding back
wheat might find the market collapsing around them. 25 So,
everything considered, the first World War was not a shortcut to Utopia for New Mexico's wheat farmers ..
Like those who raised wheat, the producers of beans
also had to make serious decisions. The harvest which
preceded the war year of 1917 was one of the most encouraging in history. So large a crop bringing high prices allowed
· many farmers to pay off all their debts and have enough
money left over to buy some luxuries. 26 Not a small number
found themselves growing wealthy. Pinto beans had been
almost unknown as a commercial
crop only a , few years
.
before that; but capable of being raised where' there was
low· rainfall, twenty-five million pounds were gtown in the
United States during 1916. In 1917 there was great expansion all over the coi.mtry, 27 and in New Mexico the Council
of Defense made every effort to expand bean acreage .. Approximately $80,000 was made available to farmers in the
"value of seed distributed and other assistance given." 28
Drought which retarded the beans during the growing
season, also placed them in hazard of an early frost. Yet
in spite of other complaints that too much land had been
planted for its most effective use, the crop of harvested·
beans bulked large. 29 Mountainair, "capital" of the bean
growing country, was experiencing a business boom. In
that vicinity smiling bean farmers built homes, and priced
new automobiles. 30 • At first prices remained high; from
Clayton there was a report that, compared to the pre-war
'

25. Ibid., October 18, 1918'; Earl J. Wilson, Hillsboro, to Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, September 21, 1918, FA132AA1-38027.
26. Albuquerque Morning Journal, April 13, 1917.
27. Frank Macy Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War (New York,
1928). 361-363.
28. Charles Springer, Santa' Fe, to W. S. Gifford, Washington. D. C., November
17, 1917, Council of National Defense Papers; Questionnaire report, September 1, 1918.
29. Albuquerque Morning Journal, September 27, 1917.
30. Ibid., September 4, 1917.
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price of three cents, beans were bringing from nine to ten
and one-half cents per pound. •A county agent reported from
Colfax county that farmers expected at least ten cents per
pound f.o.b. at their shipping point. 31 What they failed to
consider was that the amount of beans raised in the country
had increased from about nine to twenty million bushels.
Production of pinto beans alone was forty-five percent over
that of 1916.32
Sensing a marketing problem, Ely late in September
asked Herbert Hoover to arrange contracts with the army,
navy,, and European allies, 33 and Arthur C. Ilfeld of the
Charles Ilfeld Co. (wholesale grocer's at Las Vegas) was
chosen by a group of producers and buyers to be the head.
of the state food administration's new bean producers'
division. 34 The food administration had two objectives in·
bean marketing: first, to establish better relations between
the buyers and producers, and, second, to bring about a
standard marketable product. With regard to the second
' objective, the buyers and producers were able to decide upon
certain regulations for the trade: all beans should be sold
upon the basis of re-cleaned beans, all beans should ·be.
shipped in one hundred pound net weight sacks, and gross
handling expense including the buyer's profit should not be
more than five percent for choice re-cleaned beans.35 Growers, however, were fearful that wholesale dealers, as in the
past, would buy up the crop at a low figure. Since the farmers had no organization for marketing the beans, they had
for years been at the mercy of local merchants. Therefore,
with an eye to former practices, Charles Springer suggested
to WalterS. Gifford, head of the national Council of Defense,
that a government purchasing committee should buy through
lo.cal purchasing agents directly from the producers. County
Councils of Defense and county financial agents of the state
31. Santa Fe New Mexican, October 26, 1917; State county agent leadel"'s reporl
for October, 1917, p. 2.
32. Mullendore, 302.
33. Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, to Herbert Hoover, Washington, D. C., September 22,
1917, (telegram), FA6HA1-3087.
34. Santa Fe New Mexican, October 20, 1917.
35. Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, to Herbert Hoover, Washington, D. C., October
20, 1917, (telegram), FA6HA1-3087.
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council could have all the beans re-cleaned, sacked, and
collected at shipping points upon the government's order.36
Though at the time the suggestion was not accepted favorably, at least it foreshadowed later governmental action.
Behind the vexations of bean marketing loomed an
impressive problem: the refusal of consumers in eastern
cities to take the colored pinto bean so long as they could
get the white navy bean. Especially in New England and
the' middle Atlantic states the:r:e were few calls for pintos,
. while the demand for white beans all but exceeded the supply.
Even granting that markets in the west and middle west
took large amounts of the colored beans, the increased supply
(Colorado's crop was four hundred percent greater than
that of 1916, and New Mexico's between fifty and a hundred
percent larger) meant that there were some three thousand
carloads above actual needs west of the Alleghenies. 37 The ,
federal food administration tried 'advertising; it told the
eastern housewife that pintos were just as nutritious as
white beans, and pointed out that in times of soaring food
prices they were thirty-five to forty percent cheaper.
Pamphlets were sent out through local food administration
outlets in New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia, while
several large distributing houses like Montgomery Ward,
Sears Roebuck, etc. listed the variety in their catalogues. 38
But there were few signs of favorable results from all the
propaganda.
As the autumn of 1917 advanced, the New Mexican bean
farmers tended to.. become worried and disillusioned. On
the average, the yield per acre was low-about one hundred
fifty pounds. Some fields had been· lost altogether through
hail and dry weather, and the production costs for the rest
were not less than $5.00 per hundred pounds. 39 · Hopeful
rumors that the United States government would fix the
36. Charles Springer, Santa Fe, to W. S. Giffotrd, Washington, D. C., August 21,
· 1917, Council of National Defense Papers.
87. United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C;, Pl'€Ss Release No. 552,
December 23, 1917. Press Releases, vol. 6.
38. Surface, 364; Mountainair. Indepert.iknt, January 17, ·1918.
39. Simon Vorenberg, Wagon Mound, to Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, November 1,
1917, (oopy), FA6HA1-3087.
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price of beans as it had that of wheat were disproved in
October when the federal food administration informed Ely
that although bean dealers would be licensed, the price of
beans would not be fixed "at present."40 Another spark of
optimism flared when the army and navy announced. they
were making contracts for pinto beans, but flickering enthusiasm died quickly when the contracts designated the relatively disappointing price of $7.75 per hundredweight. 41
And what made the news far more discouraging were the
circulars distri.buted by local dealers to the effect that the
government purchases would· rule prices, and that New
Mexican· merchants, therefore, would offer no more than
$6.50 per hundred pound sack. 42 County agents of the
extension service then met with farmers in "protest meetings"; appeals were sent to Ely, who, in turn,· took the
grievances to a November bean conference in Washington. 43
Meanwhile, suggestions of all kinds were made in the New
Mexican press; typical was one that New Mexico pinto bean
growers should send demonstrators to each of the army
camps to popularize the pintos among the troops. 44 By
early January, however, little if anything had been done.
Ely, nettled by his failure in the east, tried without success
to get loans on the security of beans in storage from the
Wichita farm loan bank. 45 To make matters worse, Herbert
Hoover wrote a letter to state representative Martin D.
Foster which was published in the Mountainair newspaper.
·In this he mentioned that five years earlier "practically all
the farmers stated that three cents per pound would make
a profitable crop for them." Then, continuing, he reasoned:
"It hardly seems possible that the expenses of growing have
advanced three hundred percent in New Mexico but we do
40. United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C., to Ralph C. Ely, Santa
Fe, October 20, 1917, (teelgram copy), ibid.
41. Simon Vorenberg, Wagon M0111nd, to Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, November 1,
1917, (copy), ibid.
42. "Report of the State County Agent Leader for· the Month of November,
1917," pp. 2, 6, 9, Department of Agriculture Archives.
'
43. Santa Fe New Mexican, November 8, 1917.
44. Ibid:, December 18, 1917.
. 45. Ralph C. Ely~ Santa Fe, to United States Food Administration, Washington,
D. C., January 2, 1918,' (telegram), FA6HA2-3193.
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know that the selling price of beans has increased from one
'
hundred percent to two hundred percent in the past few
years, and as the public becomes better acquainted with this
bean, we believe that its price will more nearly approach
that of
. the white bean." If Hoover sought to convince irate
bean owners he was mistaken. Scathing editorial comment
accompanied the letter. Five years before, the editorial
recalled, when beans sold at from two to three cents per
pound, corn was selling at $1.50 per hundred weight; in
1918 corn was selling at $4.50. · Flour had risen from $3.00 '
to $9.09 per hundred in the same interval of time. It concluded :46
'

'

Machinery, clothing, meats, and practically
everything the farmer has had to buy, while growing these same ·beans, have advanced in the same
proportion. And yet the pinto bean grower according to Mr. Hoover should be satisfied to accept
the 6 cents a pound he is offered for his beans . . .
Our farmers are anxious to help in every way
possible in the: present crisis, but that their products should go begging at less than actual cost of
production, ·while they must pay so much higher
prices proportionately, for their necessities, does
not set well, nor tend to increase production.
Whether because of the indignation of the bean growers, or in spite of it, the United States Food Administration
did succeed in marketing the bean surplus. The administration's Grain Corporation announced it would buy seventyfive percent of the bean crop at $8.80 per hundredweight,
provided it was offered re-cleaned, standardized beans, in
new sacks. The price would be f.o.b. at ' all points of shipment in New Mexico and Arizona. 47 That this was an
important boon to the farmers there can ·be no doubt; a
month before that, two carloads of beans at Estancia and
Moriarty had sold for $6.75, and the market was dull at the
prevailing $7.00-7.50 price.48 Yet there was no wave of
jubilation after the Grain · Corporation's announcement.
46. Mountainair Independent, January 17, 1918.
47 Santa Fe New Mexican, February 13, 1918.
48. Ibid., January 7, 1918.
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·Only with the greatest misgivings did many growers. surren.,
der their hopes for ten cent beans. 49 Better judgment, however, soon triumphed, ,and the Santa Fe New Mexican gave
the common-sense attitude of many when it asserted : " . . .
the bean grower isn't going to be meticulous about a fairprice-always provided that the fellow he sells his beans to
isn't going to make the big rake-off after the farmer has had
all the grief." 50 By the middle of July, the food administration had contracted for forty-three million pou·nds of pinto
beans in the United States. No less than 9,174,300 pounds
had been shipped from New Mexico by then. But only
5,462,557 pounds were shipped .under contract; many
growers merely delivered their beans to food administration
shippers without signing contracts. 51 There were a few
instances of non-cooperation, as, for example, the case of two
dealers who insisted that ten percent profit was insufficient
for their services in cleaning, .bagging, and marketing. 52
As a final word on bean production it is interesting to note
that with characteristic optimism the New Mexican farmers
planted another large bean acreage in 1918. To aid them,
the food administration procured and stored quantities of
selected seed which it sold at nine. cents per pound, cash in
advance. This seed was distributed from Charles Ilfeld and
Co. at Las Vegas, and from the IsbellNew Mexico Elevator
Company at Willard.5a
Perhaps a less important but no less bothersome marketing problem concerned the broom-corn raised in New Mexico. With the permission of Administrator Ely broom-corn
was planted in some places, especially in Curry county, as a
crop necessary to hygienic welfare. When the time came to
49. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to [George H.] Warrington, Washington, D. C.,
March 18, 1918, FA6HA2-3194; id. to Herbert Hoover, Washington, D. C., June 26, ·
1918, FA6HA3-3345;
Santa Fe New Mexican, March .2, 1918.
.
.
50. Ibid., February 12, 1918.
51. Ibid., July 18, 1918.
52. [!C. P.] Kimball, Washington, D. C., to Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, March
19, 1918, (telegram copy), FA6HA2-3194.
53. 0. H .. Liebers, Denver, to "Newspapers and Bankers,', April 22, 1918,
(mimeographed), FA132AA1-38029: "Federal Food Administraror," Albuquerque, to
Santa Fe Land and Development Co., Chicago, May 3, 1918, (copy), ibid.; id. to
Charles Ilfeld Co., et al., Las Vegas, etc., April27, 1918, (copy), ibid.; id. to :M. R.
Gonzales, East Las Vegas, April 27, 1918, (oopy), ibid.
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market the crop in the fall of 1917, local buyers of broomcorn offered the farmers only from $125 to $200 per ton,
but because of the county Farm Bureau it was known that
it was bringing as high as $325 on the large markets. Consequently, many were able to get higher prices with the
cooperation of the food administration and Department of·
Agriculture which negotiated with dealers in New York and
elsewhere to take the product directly from the growers. As
an aftermath, one Curry county dealer was haled before the
district court on the. charge that he had engaged in monopoly
practices to hold prices down below market levels. Three
farmers testified against him before the grand jury, and it
indicted him on the basis of monopoly that was. presented.
But the defendant's lawyers then presented a demurrer, and
the presidins- judge threw the case out of court. Thus
unsuccessfully ended the farmers' battle with the broomcorn monopolist. But they had won a larger victory. Their
marketing organizations were beginning to allow them to
cut through the strangling limitations of local marketing
controls. 54
·
Drought,· which was ever a portentous factor in New
Mexico's wartime food problems, affected another of the
state's vital enterprises-stock raising. It is. true that, in
spite of the weather, livestock increased in 1917; mules,
horses, hogs, and cattle all were more numerous. 55 But
nonetheless, during the fall of 1917, the withered range
forced drastic measures in some regions. In Lea county,
for example, practically all the stock was removed in September, and many families prepared to migrate. 5 6 With the
drought unbroken at the end of the year, hundreds of
54. R. E. Putney, Albuquerque, to E. Peterson, Clovis, May 11, 1918, (copy),
ibid.; Ralph c. Ely, Albuquerque, to id., May 13, 1918, (copy), ibid.; id. to Llata,
Lowenberg, and Schlegel, Inc., New York City, June 21, 1918, (telegram copy), ibid.;
id. to Frederick M. Stone, Washington; D. C., June 11, 1918, ibid.;. M. T. Dunlavy,
Santa Fe, to Julius Barnes, Washington, ·D. C., November 28, 1917, ibid.; E. Peterson,
Clovis, to A. C. Cooley, State College, August 24, ·1918, in "Broom Corn-Special
Material," p. 410, Department of Agriculture Archives; "Report of the State County
Agent Leader. for the Month of December, 1917," p. 3, ibid.; State county agent
leader's report for October, 1917, p. 2.
55. Santa Fe New Me.,ican, February 6, 1918.
56. W. L. Elser, State College, to W: M. Cook, Washington, D. C., December 29,
1917, Department of Agriculture Archives.
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thousands of cattle were leaving the state. 57 What at first
seemed to be a mild winter gave a little encouragement, but
ori January 9-10, a heavy blizzard piled up snowdrifts five
to eight feet high, and after it came severe cold which
· added to· the losses of stockmen in northern parts of the
state. 58 Rumor had it that many cowmen were so discour. aged that they had just about decided to give up herefords
for angora. goats whose fleece could be used as mohair for
covering airplane wings
a new industry. 59
What was to be done for the stockmen? It was a query
which had several answers. In its own behalf the New Mexico Cattle and Horse Growers' Association decided that
overhead expenses might be cut by using the drought as
an argument in securing the reduction of a proposed ten percent increase in· the tax valuation of cattle.60 And, adopting
another approach, it cooperated with the state Council of
Defense and county extension service agents to secure a
sizeable state appropriation for a fight against predatory
animals and rodents. 61 To take advantage of all available
pasture,· the number of sheep permitted to graze in the
national forest was increased from 100,000 in 1917 to
130,000 in 1918.62· Self,..reliant .ranchers began to contract
for grass. and feed in Kansas and Missouri to protect their
herds from starvation. 63 In the summer of 1918 such shipments continued, but then they were mostly to points ih
·Texas where there had been heavy rains and the grass was
in good shape. 64 Both the food administration and the
Council of Defense worked hard to requisition railroad cars
for the cattle. By November, 1917, 3,225 cars had already
section
of the state, the Santa
.been secured. In the southern
.
.
Fe railroad granted preferential handling to cattle moved
in the critical period. At the same time local embargoes
WARTIME FOOD PROBLEMS,

57. Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, to United States Food Administration, Washington,
D. C., January 3, 1918, FA6HA2-3193.
.
58. Santa Fe New Mexican, December 29, 1917, January 15, 1918.
59. Ibid., December 14, 1917.
'
60.
Ibid., November 20, 1917, January 2, 1918.
61. Final Report New Mexico Council of Defense, 89-63.
62. Santa Fe New Mexican, February 16, 1918.
63. Ibid., May 27, 1918.
64. Ibid., July 16, 1918.
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were laid against the movement of livestock from territories
where there was an adequate supply of food for them. 65
Government lists were prepared and shown to farmers who
desired buyers for their cattle or areas where pasturage
could be found.6 6 A proposal to send cattle into Mexico for
grazing was discouraged by the
food administration in ·
•
Washington, chiefly on the ground that turbulent conditions
in the Mexican states, and lack of responsible control of the
states by the central Mexican government would make for
insecurity if not worse. 67
From another angle the problem of saving New Mexico's
cattle was attacked by an effort to increase the food supply
of cattle within the state. Scarcity and the high price of
cattle feed was the greatest obstacle. In November, 1917,
representatives of the Panhandle and Southwestern Cattlemen's Association, Deming District, informed Herbert
Hoover that the price of cotton-seed products was so excessive that cattlemen would not be able to feed their stock. 68
Besides, New Mexican owners were having great difficulty
in getting cotton-seed cake from Texas at any price. Priorities on shipment were secured, and'E. A. Peden of Houston, state food administrator in Texas, was able to offer cake
requisitioned by the food administration to cattle feeders
at $51.00 per ton, f.o.b. Galveston. 69 That was considerably
under the market price, although it was not until October,
1918, that
the price of cotton-seed products was definitely
•
fixed, and jobbers were limited to a margin of four percent
profit. 70 The task of bringing the feed into the state was not
a small one, considering that at least one-third of New Mexico's million and three quarters head of cattle were going
65. United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C., Press Release no. ·
427, November 5, 1917. Press Releases, vol. 5.
66. State county agent leader's report for November, 1917, p. 8.
67. M. T. Dunlavy, Santa Fe, to John H. Hallowell, Washington, D. C., December 19, 1917, FA6HA2-3194; United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C.,
.to Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, December 12, 1917, (copy), ibid.
68. Santa Fe New Mexica11, November 5, 1917.
69. United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C., Press Release no.
499, December 1, 1917. Press Releases, vol. 5; Ralph C. Ely, Santa Fe, to United
States Food Administration, Washington, D. C., December 20, 1917, FA6HA2-3194;
Santa Fe New Mexican, November 15, 1917.
70. Albuquerque Morning Journal, October 23, 1918.
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to have to be fed.U It was made somewhat less expensive
when the extension service, the state food administration,
and the New Mexico State Corporation Commission jointly
succeeded in getting a reduction of one-half in freight rates
on all feed shipments into the drought-stricken areas. 72 .
Ingenuity also uncovered new emergency feed. Chopped
yucca came into common use, while an appliance similar to
a gasoline blow-torch burned the spines fr9m cactus so that
it might be fed to cattle. Sotol and beargrass were found by
tests at the State College to have value as feed. Shredding
machines, necessary to prepare these plants, were put on the
market, and county agents assisted stockmen in getting
them. 73 Nor did the serv:ices of the extension organization
stop there. In 1917 alone, 48,000 cattle were vaccinated for
black-leg. It assisted in bringing in nearly five hundred
head of pure-bred or pigh grade stock for breeding purposes; one milk testing association· was organized, and one
hundred and eight silos were built as a result . of agents'
activities. 74 Still another change was sought in New Mexico's production habits. Quite the same as in the case of
wheatfl.our, New Mexico had been accustomed to import
three quarters of its beef from outside the state. Cattle
commonly were raised to the age of one or two years, then
shipped outside the state to fatten. Therefore, the advantages of feeding, finishing, and home marketing of meats
was proposed as the chief topic 'for discussion at a retail
butchers' and grocers' conference held under the auspices
of the state food administration in Albuquerque on December 27-28, 1917.75 Three animal husbandry experts from
the State College made addresses and gave demonstrations.
Of course, it was highly advisable to avoid shipping hogs
and cattle to eastern markets and then to ship the product
back when railroads could hardly stand the strain. But the
drought continued to be the limiting factor for the remain•
der of the war.
71.
72. ·
73.
74.
75.

Santa Fe New Meo;ican, November 15, 1917.
A. C. .Qooley, Fourth Annual' Report, p. 17.
Ibid., pp. 53-54; Santa Fe New Me:xJican, February 15, 1918.
A. C. Cooley, Third Annual Report, p. 29.
Santa F~ New Me:xJican, December 26, 1917, January 7, 1918.
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One of the elements in production costs that plagued
farmers most was labor supply. It was not a problem
peculiar to agriculture; coal mining, railroading, lumbering,
and other essential New Mexico industries felt it. As a matter of fact, the use of school boys and girls helped the situation in agriculture to at least a small degree. From the
earliest days of the war, J. H. Wagner, superintendent of
public instruction, was engaged in enlisting young people
for farm work. Simultaneously, he was director of the
department of education and labor of the Council of Defense,
federal state director of the United States Public Service
Reserve, and state director of the Boys Working Reserve. 76
Particularly in the Boys Working R:eserve many able-bodied
high school youths were enlisted for agricultural service.
During the 1918 vacation period, 860 boys and 809 girls
were employed, and ·received wages that totalled over
$150,000. Each 9f these volunteers was entitled to wear
the "Badge of Honor of Soldiers of the Soil." 77 Boys and
Girls Clubs under the auspices of the extension service also
were busy. In 1918, it was estimated that they cultivated
1,588,395 square feet of garden, and that from this they
canned nearly 11,500 quarts of garden produce. 78 Open
markets were set up; especially in Santa Fe, where the
gardeners could bring their goods for sale or exchange. 79
In cooperation with the Council of Defense, the state food
administration appointed Mrs. Isaac Barth to be the head
of a home garden division, and under her direction over
three thousand plots were planted in 1918. 80 · A careful
effort was made to see to it that no vegetables or fruit .
spoiled because of faulty preservation methods or lack of
labor. In September, 1917, as an illustration, the state food
administration and other agencies worked together to save
thousands of pounds of peaches in San Juan county. Scores
of home-made
evaporators were built with the help of school
.
.

76. Final Report New Mexico Council of Defense, 25.
77. Santa Fe New Mexican, March 9, October 17, 1918.
78. Charles Orchard Smith, "Report of Boys and Girls Club Work-1918,"
Department of Agriculture Archives.
79. Sarita Fe New Me:~:ican, May 4, July 9, 1917.
80. Ibid., July 1, 1918; Questionnaire report, March 23, 1918.
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boys, each plant with the capacity of one hundred pounds of
fruit per day. ·Bleaching sheds were also constructed in
every community, and in all not less than fifty carloads of
perishables were saved. 81
· But valuable as it was, ·the labor furnished by young
men and women in gardens, orchards, and elsewhere, was
not enough. By' August, 1917, it was conceivable that a
substantial loss of food might. occur because of a lack of
laborers for the harvest. An aggravated complication in the
labor shortage was the demand for laborers to construct
cantonments and other government buildings at Deming.
By offering higher wages, contractors caused many farm
laborers to leave their places for opportunities at the army
camps. Charles Springer, in suggesting a remedy for this
condition, proposed that changes should be made in federal
laws and regulations to permit the importation of Mexican
contract laborers under bond to work on government construction projects. Other voices were overheard advocating
that Japanese and Chinese in Mexico should be allowed
to come in for labor in the fields. If those solutions couldn't
be worked out then, it was further suggested, perhaps the
Department of Commerce and Labor could induce American
workmen from outside the agricultural districts to move in
to do the construction work, with the contractors paying
for their transportation. 82 November, 1917, found Springer
-renewing his appeals. He then advocated that one commission be. sent by the federal government to As.ia, and·
another one to South America "to select and secure a number
of laborers who could be used under proper regulations in
the United States for a limited time and during the continuance of the war emergency." 83 Although no widespread
measures were taken to spread United States labor procurement over the world, it was reported that "hordes" of
Mexican farm laborers ·flocked into the United States in the
spring of 1918, and that they left for farm districts in Colo81. State county agent leader's report for November, 19.17, p. 8; Ralph C. Ely;
Santa Fe, to Herbert Hoover, Washington, D. C., September 22, 1917, FA6HA1-8087.
82. Charles Springer, Santa Fe, to W. S. Gifford, Washington; D. C., August 17,
. 1917, (copy), Council of National Defense Papers.
83. Id. to George F. Porter, Washington, D. C., November 21, 1917, t"bid.

~-

·-··-~-----~---------,---~-~

36

•

\

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

rado, California, and New Mexico. 84 · As a part of a general
drive against members of the International Workers of the
World and other laboring class "radicals," J. 0. Miller, ·a
farm specialist at the State College, made a tour of observation through the Pecos valley and the eastern districts of
the state. · He recommended that sheriffs and their aides
should begin a drive against vagabonds, idlers, and others
who were trying to dodge work. That would do something
to lessen the shortage of farm and ranch labor there. 85
Naturally, the selective ·service system which called
many New Mexicans into the armed forces had its influence
upon the state's labor problems. Already in June, 1917;
Springer, in an appeal to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker,
asked that the draft regulations should exempt from military service those men "whose services in agricultural and
industrial pursuits are of greater public necessity than their
services in the army." 86 About six months later, General
E. K: Crowder, provost marshal in charge of the draft,
announced changes in the selective service system which
promised to go far toward answering the request for deferment. It was explained that an occupational questionnaire
would be sent to every registrant who had not yet been
drafted, and only men who could be spared from industry
and agriculture would be taken. The final decision of deferment, however, rested with the local "draft" or exemption
boards. 87 President Wilson himself informed the people
that farmers were being given no blanket exemption from
the draft, though he hoped the new regulations would make
it possible for the farmers' supply of labor to be "much less
seriously drawn upon." 88 Policies differed somewhat from
board to board. Frequently, the county extension service
agents were called upon to testify concerning a man's value
in his current occupation. 89 Exemption Board No. 1 decided
84. Santa Fe New Mexican, May 17, 1918.
85. Ibid., June 28, 1918.
86. Charles Springer, Santa Fe, to Newton D. Baker, Washington, D. C., June 9,
1917, (telegram), Council of National Defense Papers.
87. Santa Fe New Mexican, November 12, 1917.
88. Ibid., January 31, 1918.
89. A. C. Cooley, Fourth Annual Report, p. 68.
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to place in the deferred classification all- young men who
were turning out farm products .that would be valuable to
the nation in time 'of war, but with the proviso that if any
man didn't come forth with the largest quantity of crops
of which his labor and enterprise were capable his case
would be reconsidered. 90 Notwithstanding the mitigations,
there was· a general opinion in the spring of 1918 that the
draft would surely take many who would be needed to harvest the crops. Ely gloomily noted during April that most
local exemption boards were classifying young farmers
skilled in irrigation and dry land farming in "class one,
division 'A.' " 91 Business and professional men began to
consider closing their establi~hments, and taking to the
fields with their employees to garner in the harvest. 92 And
· Seqetary of State Antonio Lucero came forth with . the
neighborly proposal that "Home Guards" should be formed .
in every county to care for the farms of those who had
been called into the army. County Councils of Defense, he
believed, could forward such work. 93 Late in the summer,
some "agricultural furloughs" were granted to men ]n the
military service who were still reasonably close to the]r
homes, and who were needed there in order that the crops
might be harvested. 94 However, little was done to red]stribute the civilian labor supply. 95 Had not the war ended
in the fall of 1918, there would undoubtedly have been an
extremely critical manpower shortage the following spring.
VI. FOOD ADMINISTRATION : CLIMAX AND FINALE
In the last analysis the success or faiiure of price regulation, production, and many other tasks of wartime liv]ng
depended upon the. good sense and cooperative spirit of the
people. Perhaps elaborate organizations like the Council of
Defense and the state food administration were necessary to
90. Santa Fe New Me.,U,an, February 13, 1918.
91. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to [United States] Food Administmtion, Wa•l:t- ·
ington, D. C., April 11, 1918, FA6HA2-3193.
92. Santa Fe New Me.,wan, March 8, 1918.
93. Ibid., July 10, 1918•
. 94. A. C. Cooley," Fourth Annual Report, p. 68.
95. Qiueotionnaire reports, March 23, June 20, 1918.

•

-~·-------------·.'

38

,,

,-,.

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

coordinate the efforts of patriotic volunteers-at times they
succeeded very well in doing just that. Yet it cannot be
denied that morale shattering inconsistencies, much wasted
effort, and hurtful quarrels were equally characteristic of
them. This was particularly true of the state food administration. Its history until the autumn of 1918 was one of
constantly growing complexity. With an endlessly shifting
personnel, it had one of the most extensive organizations of
any state food administration in the country. This was built
around four central officials: the food administrator, assistant administrator (an office created on May 21, 1918), executive secretary, and field secretary. Ely chose H. G. Bush of
the Deming Lumber Company to act as his assistant administrator, and after Ely's resignation in September, 1918,
Bush succeeded him as acting administrator for a few weeks.
The executive secretary, who was in fact the manager of
the office and a more important figure than the assistant
administrator, was a state senator, Melvin T. Dunlavy~ On
May 1, 1918, allegedly because of "office. politics," he resigned, and returned to private law practice in Santa Fe.
Later he served the administration as county administrator; · ·
and became secretary to Senator A. A. Jones. He was succeeded as executive secretary by M. R. Johnston, a public
accountant, who served as acting food administrator during
the last weeks of the war. 1 Ely's first field secretary, J. H.
Toulouse, before he became associated with the food administration had been in the employ of the State College as
assistant organizer of Boys and Girls clubs. For a time
his relations with Ely were most satisfactory, but one of .
the most disgraceful quarrels of the administration, and
one that resulted in Ely's resignation as well, caused him
to leave the organization on July 15, 1918. His field secretary position then was filled by C. H. Lowber; who before
that had acted as the administration's auditor. 2
Santa Fe New Mexican, April 29, 1918; Albuquerque Morning JO'Urnal, October 3, 1918 ; "Tabulation of Data Received in Questionnaires! From State Administrators," FA6H-C71; "Personnel of the New Mexico Food Administration-Past and
Present,'' FA6HC1-3609.
2. "Statement Showing Names and Rates Paid in the Office of the State Food
Administrator at Albuquerque, New Mexico," FA6HA3-3343.
1.
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Outside of the central executive officers, the most important figures were the individual heads. Af first they
were few in number, but new ones constantly were added as
the food ~dministrator became involved in ever more varied
activities. By the spring of 1918 there were no less than
thirteen divisions, grouped into two bureaus: one "commercial," the other for "conservation." The divisions with
their heads were :3
Grocery division ___ _:_ ____ Arthur Pruitt of Roswell
Bakery__________ Charles Jaeger of Albuquerque
Beans and Canned Goods, A. C. Ilfeld of Las Vegas
Law _________________ M. J. Helmi~k of Santa Fe
Retail Stores______ c. 0. Cushman of Albuquerque
Fruits ___________ L. Bradford Prince of Santa Fe·
Livestock _____________ B. F. Pankey of Santa Fe
Meat_ ________________ A. B. Betz of Albuquerque
Utilization of Waste.___ ._____ John D. Clark of the
University of New Mexico
Confectionery __________ L. M. Fee of Albuquerque
Hotels and Re~taurants __ John 0. Pritchard, Clovis
Perishable Groceries, Roy A. Stamtn, Albuquerque
Transportation _____ N. E. Johnson of Albuquerque
Flour and Milling ____ R. E. Putney of Albuquerque
"
Another important
office was that of "director of education" or "publicity agent," which E. Dana Johnson, editor
of the Santa Fe New Mexican, continued to hold until the
end of the administration. · His deep involvement in New
Mexican factional politics continually tinged the activities
of the state food administration with political bias. For
example; at one time Charles Springer of the Council of
Defense barred one of Johnson's New Mexican reporters
from his office on the ground that the New Mexican had
accused the Council of Defense of being a political body.
Then, gleefully aware that his critical shafts had found
their mark, Johnson reported that
threatened the
. Springer
.
New Mexican with prosecution under the espionage act for
3.

Santa Fe New Mezican, April 4, 1918.
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criticizing the Council,4 A much less controversial member
of Ely's staff was George' Roslington, vice president and
general manager of the Occidental Life Insurance Company.
As "financial adviser" his title was somewhat misleading,
for actually he did not concern himself with the food admin~
istration's fiscal matters. In an informal manner he sought
to advise numerous farmers who applied to the administration concerning ways and means of financing enlarged
production and new farm equipment. 5
Many of the division heads were only titular members
of the administration. Few, if any, traces of activity can be
found for some of these divisions, and Ely in his reports was
frank to admit that they were not ·uniformly satisfactory.
All of the division heads were civic volunteers who received
'
no pay for their work. The praiseworthy diligence of some,
of them is for that reason a still better proof of their loyalty
and civic pride. In the grocery division, perhaps the most
active of all the divisions, A. J. Maloy was the able salaried
assistant of Arthur Pruitt. In fact, in Ely's words, Maloy
came to act as "dean" of the "commer~ial" bureau. At the
head of the "conservation" bureau, David Ross Boyd, president of the University- of New Mexico, occupied a similar
office without compensation. 6 One of the most notable
changes among divisional leaders was the replacement of
B.. F. Pankey with H. L. Kerr, state senator of. the Grant.Sierra-Socorro district, as head of the livestock division.After stricter attempts were made to enforce the administra- tion's regulations, an enforcement division was added with
JudgeR. P. Barnes as its leader; about the same time E. N.
Boule of Gross-Kelly Company became head of an investigation division. 7 One of the divisions caused Ely not a little
embarrassment. His first nomination for head of the bakery
unit was that of G. A. Pappe of Albuquerque. Owing to
unusual circumstances, Pappe, a German immigrant with
property in Germany, had never received his final natural-

-

4. Ibid., August 13, 1918.
5. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C., March
18, 1918, FA6HA1-3087.
6. Ibid.
7. Santa Fe New Mexican, .June 14, July 1, 1918.
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papers. At the outbreak of the European war in
1914 he had registered as a German reservist to prevent his .
holdings abroad from being confiscated. But as soon as it
became known, that an "enemy alien" had been made the
head of a division in the state food administration there was
loud excitement and much criticism. Amid the hysteria it
was quite ineffectual for Ely to explain that Pappe's wife
was a member of the Red Cross and that Pappe himself had
bought many Liberty bonds. The Bernalillo county Council
of Defense and city manager Redington demanded that
Pappe be dismissed from his food administration post. At
first, Ely stood his ground, but finally he gave way before
the attack, and accepted the resignation, which, under the
circumstances, Pappe was quite willing to offer. 8
There was a steadily rising expense curve for the administration until the climax was reached shortly before
Ely's resignation. In mid-summer, 1918, there were thirtysix paid workers receiving a monthly payroll of $1201.41.
By September, the number of salaried employees had
dropped to twenty-six. Working with the paid employees,
however, was an.ever-changing but constantly growing staff
of volunteers; they numbered almost one hundred seventyfive near the end of the administration.9 In truth, Ely did
not wish to appoint many of them to positions of city and
county administrators. He held back until the summer of
1918, when the federal food administration practically forced
him to make the appointments. At that time New Mexico
was one of the few states which did not have county administrators. Ely had much preferred to develop "the natural
leaders in the trades" through whom he could reach "the
· lesser merchants." As a supplement he was willing to
depend upon "a scheme of reporters or inspectors for our .
widely separated communities."10 Perhaps his dislike for
the state Council of Defense reinforced his prejudice against
8. Ibid., March 23, 1918; Ralph C.· Ely, Albuquerque, to John W. Hallowell,
Washington, D. C., March 23, 1918, FA6HA2-3193.
9. "New Mexico Historical Summary of the Food Administration,'' FA6HC13609. Statement Showing Names and Rates Paid . . . , FA6HA3-3343.
10. Ralph.C. Ely, Albuquerque, tO K. S. Clow, Washington, D. C., May 18, 1918,
FA6HA2-3194.
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county organizations. At least· he criticized the council's
selection of county committees as hasty and arbitrary.U At
another time he admitted that he was opposed to county
administrators because they lent themselves with "such
frightful ease" to political manipulation. As an alternative
he suggested that the head of every. division whose work
touched upon one or more counties should appoint his own
representatives in those counties.12 That might have meant
Ely's abnegation of political ~mbitions, but again it could
have been a device for securing a stronger political following among the members of his organization. In .the end,
he decided to appoint county administrators; twenty-five
were qualified and began to serve in July. Two counties,
because of local conditions, were divided into two districts
with an administrator for each. 13 Some of the administrators gave a substantial amount of time to the work, but
because of internal turmoil it is doubtful whether the morale
or effectiveness of the food administration was any higher
in the fall of 1918 than it had been before. On the contrary,
there is.reason to believe that the organization was far more
perfunctory then. Had not the war ended in November, a
general reorganization would have been imperative.
Largely responsible for the declining importance of
the state food administration was an inglorious demonstration of. ineptitude and petty jealousies that led to Ely's
resignation. In part, Ely himself must be charged with
failure. For although of good appearance and plausible to
a degree that he could make others. believe in him, his
ambitions and enthusiasms were apt to run away with his
judgment. Frequently his generous loyalty to those who had
won his confidence prevented him from taking steps which
were manifestly in the interest of the public he was pledged
to serve. To cite only a few instances: New Mexico was
one of the last states in the union to have publication of
fair price lists; it was among the most tardy in devising a
11. Id. to United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C., February 18,
1918, FA6HA2-3193.
12. Ibid.; id. to K. S. Clow, Washington, D. C., May 20, 1918, ibid.
18. Questionnaire reports, August 1, September 1, 1918.
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method to determine fair margins of profit for wholesalers
and retailers; it was quite remiss in checking upon the practices of licensees. To be sure the federal food administration made very little effort to remedy defects in Ely's organ:ization. Instead of applying pressure upon Ely to enforce
what were understood to be its elementary policies, its
. administrators in Washington sent out voluminous reports,
wrote letters (some querulous and some vague) about minor
matters of administration, and in general spent their time
in a snarl of details. Until the summer of 1918, only one
competent executive was sent to New Mexico to check upon
the course of the state food administration. Then, amid a
secret service investigation and the like, the Washington
administrators decided that drastic . action was necessary.
During his last months in office, Ely began to show the
strain of his consistently long hours of work in the administration. Perhaps this was because he devoted his time to
small matters that might better have been handled by subordinates, but, if so, .it was a weakness that sprang from
generous impulses. Even granting that he did not have a
sound knowledge of many aspects of economics and business
practice, he was nonetheless eager to compensate for this
with the energy and fervor of his efforts. He had the politician's sixth-sense of good fellowship. His office was always
open to visitors, and he personally answered complaints or
requests from the humblest household. 14 But as administra- ·
tive problems multiplied, he became more irritable and shorttempered. ·Late in July, 1918, he wrote to one executive in
Washington :15 "I am getting very tired physically as well as
mentally ... I am giving this work all my time and every
bit of energy that is in me. It probably represents more of
a sacrifice than I can afford, and that, of course, worries
me ..." It was common gossip that Ely's personal finances
were none too stable. Apparently he did not have an independent income, and after the early autumn of 1917 devoted
14.

See, numerous letters among Ely's correspondence in the food administration

papers.

15. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to George H. Warrington, Washington, D. C.,
July 29, 1918, FA6HA3-3343.
.
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his full time to the administration without compensation.
Living extravagantly, a goodly number of his accounts were
unpaid. Rumors connected him with a shadowy sulphur
§)peculation, and trips into the mountains with prospective
investors; but since little was known for certain, sinister
/ doubts were raised at each retelling of half-believed suspicions.16
Most serious of the complications involving Ely was a
. violent dispute with his field secretary, J. H. Toulouse. At
the beginning of the administr:ation, Toulouse had come into
the organization ~as Ely's political and personal friend. Ely
was most liberal in his praise, and as late as May, 1918, he
wrote a warm letter to Washington extolling Toulouse's
patriotism for accepting the low salary to_ serve in the food
crusadeP In January, however, the Las Vegas Optic
(hostile to the food admiriistratiQn and friendly to the state
Council of Defense) hinted mysteriously that Toulouse was
planning to leave the food administration. 18 Toulouse denied
it, but he later· admitted that in February he offered his
services to the State Council of Defense and the State College.19 Ely found this out, and afterward Toulouse made
no extensive field trips. Instead, he developed the idea of a
large mo.ther-daughter congress in Albuquerque, and in June
the project was carried out with great success. 20 In reporting to Washington at its conclusion, Ely admitted that
Toulouse had been responsible for it, and praised his work. 21
Nevertheless, Toulouse waited only a few days to tell the
Washington administrators that he was going to resign
from the state food administration; to leave little doubt
about his motives he then asked for a position as field man
with the federal administration. He might, he added, be
16. J. H. Toulouse, Santa Fe, to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C., August
6, 1918, ibid.
17. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to [Frederick M.] Stone, Washington, D. C.,
May 17, 1918, FA6HA2-3193.
18. Santa Fe New Mexican, January 26, 1918.
19. J. H. Toulouse, Albuquerque, to E. F. Cullen, Washington, D. C., June 20,
1918, FA6HA8-3843.
20.- (Jd.,) to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C., September 17, 1918,
FA6HA8-3346.
.
21. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to id., July 2, 1918, (copy), ibid.
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successful if they would allow him to stage a great national
mother-daughter congress in Chicago. 22 For the moment
John W. Hallowell of the states' administration division and
other executives were not receptive to his suggestions, but
certainly they were aware that there must be trouble within
the New Mexico state organization, especially when Toulouse
wrote on July 21 that he had accepted a position as :field
superintendent for the state Council of Defense. 23 Then, on
August 3, Hallowell was thrown into consternation by a wire
from Toulouse which read : 24 "I expect to prefer charges
against Ely. Embezzlement government funds. Will await
your. advice.". Hallowell's advice was to defer the charges,
and to send him a complete statement of them. When
Toulouse did so, it must have been clear to the executive
that they were not conclusive. There was one accusation.
that Ely had charged certain personal expenditures to his
government expense account. (That was similar to one of
the charges that had been made against him at the time
he was removed from his receivership of the New-Mexico
Central railroad.) But outside of several alleged trips to
Jemez country sulphur mines no definite instances were cited
of widespread violations. 25 Ely's trips outside the state.had
been unmistakably on food administration business, although
his estimate in the 1918-1919 budget of $13,000 for travelling expenses for the entire food administration personnel
was unusually high in relation to the salary budget of
$22,000. 26 There was a trifling matter of $57.00 that Ely
was accused of misspending after the mother-daughter congress,27 and finally, without submitting any evidence,
Toulouse implied that Ely might have received a $150 "gift"
from one of his division heads and a bribe to secure the
reinstatement of one licensee whose business had been sus/

22. J. H. Toulouse, Albuquerque, to id., July 5, 1918, FA6HA3-3843.
23. Id. to id., July 21, 1918, FAGHAS-3346.
24. Id. to id., August 3, 1918, (telegram), FA6HA3-3343.
25. Id. to id., August 6, 1918, ibid.; John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C'., to
J. H. Toulouse, Albuquerque, August 3, 1918, (telegram copy), .ibid.
26. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C., May
.
'
.
9, 1918,. (telegram), FA6HA1-3087.
27. J. H. Toulouse, Albuquerque, to id., August 6, 1918, F A6HA3-3343 •
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pended for unfair practice.s. 28 Ely in turn attacked Toulouse
in indignant letters.29
Jarred by the exchange of violent recriminations, the
states administration division in Washington handed over
to the secret service the entire file of complaints against Ely.
Rolland K. Goddard, a secret service agent, was then sent to
Albuquerque with instructions to investigate the charges.
If the secret service report corroborated them; it was understood that Ely would be asked to resign when he came to
Washington for a conference. the first week in September. 30
Goddard's investigation was quite superficial; most of the
testimony was gathered in conversations with Ely's sworn
enemies.31 Even though he hinted darkly of certain financial
irregularities in the administration of the grocers' fund from
which A. J. Maloy was paid, Ely was able to give a satisfac- '
tory accounting of it when requested to do so by the federal
food administration.32 No other evidence was produced that
was strong enough for any criminal prosecution to be based
upon. Still, Goddard's conclusion that "the Food Administration in New Mexico is a disgrace to the government"
probably influenced Herbert Hoover and his associates in
W ashington. 33 Ely was approached about his trouble with
Toulouse when he went to Washington, 34 and undoubtedly
pressure was applied to secure his resignation. As soon as
he returned to Albuquerque, ·he drafted a telegram that
read :35 "I am not within draft age but am poor and feel
compelled to relinquish this work in order to provide for
[my] family. Received attractive offer from California yesIbid.
29. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to [United States] Food Administration, States
Administration Division, Washington, D. C., September 18, 1918, ibid.
30. [James] Miles, Washington, D. C., to [W. H.] Moran, Washington, D. C.,
August 16, 1918, ibid.
31. Goddard report, August 28, 1918, pasBim, ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 21 ; "Account of Donations To Food Administration by the Retail
and Wholesale Grocers,"' FA6HA3-3346; Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to [United
States] Food Administration, States Administration Division, Washington, D. C.,
September 17, 1918, ibid.
33. Goddard report, p. 26.
34. Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, to [United States] Food Administration, States
·Administration Division, September 13, 1918, FA6HA3-3343.
35. I d. to Herbert Hoover, Washington, D. C., September 20, 1918, (telegram),
ibid.
•
28.
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terday which I desire [to] accept if I can be honorably
released ..." Hoover wrote a curt reply, but, on second
thought he redrafted it to say :36 " • • • in accepting your
resignation I wish to express my appreciation of your devoted service. I am in hopes your new position will develop
to your entire satisfaction ... " So ended a stormy chapter
in New Mexico's wartime economic history.
One aspect of Ely's resignation concerned his connection with state politics. When a copy of Hoover's "acceptance" telegram to Ely came to J. W. Hallowell's desk, the
states' administration executive endorsed it with a note
that made it clear he had been in touch with Senator A. A.
Jones, and that the senator had been quite willing that the
change should take place. 37 That was quite a different
attitude than Jones had taken a year before. During the
interval Ely steadfastly had maintained that he had done
his utmost to keep politics out of the state food administration. Toulouse, on the other hand, testified that Ely had .
instructed him, as field secretary, to keep his eyes on politics,
and to furnish the names of those who spoke well of the
food administrator's efforts. 38 R. E. Putney, who resigned
from the state Council of Defense soon after it began operations, was one of Ely's division heads. In September, 1918,
Putney unanimously was chosen chairman of the Democratic
organization in Bernalillo county,39 and at the 1918 Democratic state convention he was an unsuccessful candidate
for the gubernatorial nomination. 40 But if Ely, as his foes
claimed, attempted to build a Democratic machine in the
food administration, he failed miserably through his own
lack of political skill. His factional opponents would have
made him a target of unmerciful ridicule in the 1918 elections. · Ely could hardly expect Senator Jones to tolerate
Herbert Hoover, Washington, D ... C., to Ralph C. Ely, Albuquerque, September 21, 1918, (eopy), ibid.; Draft of telegram, id. to id., September 21, 1918, ibid.
37. See, Hallowell's endorsement on telegram eopy of Herbert Hoover to Ely,
September 21, 1918, i'bid.
38. [J. H. Toulouse]. Albuquerque, to John W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C.,
September 17, 1918, FA6HA8-8346._
39. Santa Fe New Mezican, May 17, 1917: Albuquerque Momi"''l JoumGl, Sep.i
tember 3, 1918.
40. Ibid., September 30, 1918.
36.

•
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failure to a much further degree than any other political
IeaderY However, there was a vastly different version
which reported that Ely was preparing to throw over the
Democrats in the summer of 1918. When Will Hays, Republican national chairman, visited New Mexico in April,
1918, he had spoken rather critically of some "Old Guard"
practices. He had shaken hands warmly with Ely, and
added ' "There are no yesterdays. in Republican politics." 42
By summer it had ·become apparent to all who watched the
direction of national politic;:tl straws in· the wind that the
Democratic hold was slipping. · Many were scurrying for
protection behind the Republican machin~. It was then that
large numbers of county administrators were appointed, and
most of them were Republicans. Under those circumstances
to an execution of an
Ely's exit could have been tantamount
'
inept political recusant.
Scarcely had Ely left New Mexico when the federal food administration began the task of selecting his successor.
Not wishing to repeat its earlier mistakes, it dispatched a
reliable executive, Philip B. Stewart, to the scene with
instructions to make a careful investigation and to report
upon prospective candidates. · Upon arriving Stewart informed the Washington office that H. G. Bush, who had
taken over as acting head when Ely resigned, was doing
well. In his opinion Bush might make a good permanent
head of administration, except for the fact that he was
"bound to shoot all the time and not always at the mark." 43
With memories. of Ely still fresh, that was enough to disqualify Bush, and besides he was anxious to get into the
armed forces. On September 29, he submitted his resignation, and a short while later left to join the quartermaster's
corps. 44 1\t!any other names; all of them known as stable
41. lbW.., October 26, 1918.
42. Santa Fe New Mexican, April 23, 1918.
43. Memorandum· [in George H. Warrington's handwriting], October 9, [1918],
FA6HA3-3346; [Philip S.] Stewart, Santa Fe, to [John H.] Hallowell, Washington,
D. C., October 1-2, 1918, (telegram), ibid.; id. to W.. October 4, 1918, ibW..
44. United States Food Administration, States Administration Division, Washington, D. C., to M. R. Johnr.ton, Albuquerque, November 6, .1918, (copy), FA6HA103440; H. G. Bush, Albuquerque, to J[ohn] W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C.; September 29, 1918, (telegram), FA6HA3-3343.
I
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business men, were suggested by Stewart, but of these two
in particular stood out for serious consideration. One was
that of Max Nordhaus-past president of the Albuquerque
Chamber of Commerce, head of the New Mexico Liberty loan
committee, and "active head" of Charles Ilfeld and Company. Stewart favored him as the best choice, but Nordhaus
was a Republican and Senator Jones withheld his consent.
The other prominent figure was Arthur Seligman, vice. president of the First National Bank of Santa Fe with many
other business connections, and chairman of the Democratic
state committee. Needless to say, Senator Jones highly
approved of him. But, for that matter, Stewart pointed out
that Seligman's name met approval wherever it was mentioned. His political activities had been "clean" and free
from "suspicions of political enmity." Fbr the time being
he could take a non-committal attitude; after the November
elections he would resign his political· chairmanship, and
join· the food administration. Even Springer apparently
was willing to have him under these conditions. 45 On October 9, however, word came that Senator Jones had "telegrams from several parties" urging that no selection be
made until after the elections. 46 The appointment, therefore, was never made, because the armistice followed hard.
upon the voting. Instead, M.. R. Johnston continued as
acting administrator until the state food administration was .
liquidated the following February. Wisely enough his regular salary was increased to match his added responsibilities. 47
In the bitter autumn election campaign of 1918, both
the state Council of Defense and the state food administration figured in charges and counter-charges. In a speech
at the Democratic state convention, Neill B. Field of Albuquerque made the assertion that the Council of Defense was
"packed" with Republicans, and that it had spent $325,000
/

45. [John W.] Hallowell, Washington, D. C., to [Philip B.] Stewart, Albuquerque, October 5, 1918, (telegram copy), ibid.; [Philip B.] Stewart, Albuquerque, t<>
[John W.] Hallowell, September 30, October 1, 4, 1918, (telegrams) ; Edward A.
Trefz, Albuquerque, to J[ohn] W. Hallowell, Washington, D. C., Oct<>ber 4, 1918, ibid.
46. [George H.] Warrington, Washington, D. C., to Philip B. Stewart, Santa Fe,
October 9, 1918, (telegram copy), ibid.
47. [United States] Focd Administration, States Administration Division~ .Washington, D. C., to M. R. Johnston, Albuquerque, November 15, 1918, (copy), ibid;
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of the taxpayers' money without making a satisfactory
accounting. 48 He was answered by H. 0. Bursum at the
Republican state convention. 49 County conventions of the
parties then took up the issue ; resolutions were passed either
praising or condemning the Council, and indignant speeches
accompanied them. 50 Among the newspapers, however, the
campaign made strange allies. About the time the first
campaign preliminaries were getting started, M. L. Fox,
Ely's inveterate enemy, returned to the editorship of the
Albuquerque Journal which he. had left the previous spring.
Soon he was lampooning Senator Jones' leadership of the
Democrats; one of the senator's first mistakes, he contended,
had been the appointment of Ely to the food administration. 5 1
But Ely was gone, and the_ food administration was not
quite so much in the vortex of political turmoil as it otherwise surely would have been. Even Ely's strongest ally,
the Santa Fe New Mexican, coyly came out in support of the
Republican candidates, and almost unbelievably for those
who had witnessed the vituperation its editor, Johnson, had
poured upon the ~'Old Guard", it praised Charles Springer's
uncompensated devotion to the cause of national defense. 52 _
To be sure, the New Mexican stressed national issues, and
tried to add the appearance of consistency by saying that
Republican state chairman George R. Craig was a vigorous
influence for "progressivism" who would thwart the "Old
Guard" machine. It was an ineffective dodge. Everyone
knew that the "Old Guard" still ruled, and that Governor
Lindsey had been cast aside for his· tendencies toward independent action. 53 From gubernatorial candidate 0. A.
Larrazolo downward, the Republican slate featured party
regularity. Nor was the State College passed by in the
conflict. Fox warned in his Albuquerque Journal that a
Democratic victory would mean the "return of State College
to politics". Democratic state chairman, Arthur Seligman,
48; Albuquerque Mornin.g Journal, October 3, 1918.
49. Ibid., October 24, 1918.
50. Ibid.; Santa Fe New Mezican, October 24, 1918.
51. Albuquerque Morning Journal, September 26, October 1, 1918.
52. Santa Fe New Mezican, October 24, 1918.
53. Ibid., July 1, August 23, October 17, 1918.

WARTIME FOOD PROBLEMS,

1917-1918

51

he alleged; already had attacked the college because, when
it was necessary to boost the
- production of foodstuffs, Presi-.
dent Crile had asked the Council of Defense for money to
carry on the work. 54
,
After the returns had registered a Republican vict01·y,
Seligman demanded a complete list of the state food administration personnel from acting administrator Johnston.
With unmistakable emphasis, Seligman let it be known that
he· didn't want more Democrats than Republicans in the·
organization, but that he would be glad to have· "an even
break". He also mentioned "reports" that the food administration had been more friendly to Republicans than to
Democrats in the campaign that had just ended. In reply,
Johnston admitted that he was a Republican, but affirmed
that he had "scratched" his ballot. Most of. the divisional
heads were 'Democrats. As for the county administrators,
Johnston professed that he knew the politics of only two
of them. Yet he refused to remove county administrators
who specifically were named as partisan by the Democrats,
although one food administration inspector who had been
found electioneering was dismissed from his place. 55 Either
Johnston's statement was convincing to William B. Walton,
who had been the Democratic candidate just defeated by
Albert B. Fall for the United States senate, or else Walton
was a "good loser", for he wrote to Johnston: "Like yourself I am convinced that the reports were without foundation
in fact, and I am sincerely glad to know this." 56
By the time that Johnston made his peace with the
Democratic leaders, the war had ended and the f~od admin.istration was entering its last phase. Only a month before
the armistice, the New M ex.ican had quoted Herbert Hoover
as saying there was no prospect of peace before the summer
of 1919; meanwhile allied civilians, the armies, and certain·
neutral nations would require 5,730,000 more tons of food
54. Albuquerque Mt>rning Journal, October 26, 1918.
55. M. R. Johnston, Albuquerque, to·[Grorge H.] Warrington, Washington, D. C.,
December .13, 23, 1918, FA6HA3-3343; id. to Arthur Seligman, Santa. Fe, Dece'lllber
23, 1918, (copy). ibid.
56. W. B. Walton, Washington, D. C., to M. R. Johnston, Albuquerque, December
80, 1918, (copy), ibid.
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than had been available in 1918. 57 There was at least a
possibility, some New Mexican leaders thought, that the food
administration would continue to operate at least until the
spring of 1919. 58 That it would he otherwise was clear after
November 13, for Hoover then announced he was about
ready to leave the food administration on a mission to keep
Europe from post-war starvation. In a conference with
senate leaders he agreed that extension of the food control
law and the food administration beyond the duration of the
war was unnecessary. 59 Thereafter, demobilization proceeded apace; by January 1 orily eight paid workers were
left in the New Mexico state administration, and but five
volunteers were assisting them; 60 That state office closed on
February 15; the furniture was sold, and the lease given
up. 61 Johnston would have liked to prolong some of the
services. In a letter to J. W. Hallowell, he proposed :62 "I
personally would like very much. to continue in this work
... with my stenographer and one clerk . . . I could do
everything necessary and also a great deal of educational
.work amongst the foreign population ·of this state . . ."
Hallowell's answer was in the negative.o 3
The end of the food administration did not imply that
New Mexico's food problems were solved by the armistice,
nor was it true that efforts to meet those problems were
discontinued. After tw~ years of the severest drought in
its history, between fifty al_ld seventy-five percent of New
Mexico's range cattle had been sent to other pastures or to
the slaughtering pens. Even in 1918 many of the crops in
dry-farming regions had been failures. From early fall the
price of corn and other grains had been dropping. Debtridden farmers were faced with the same old problem: high
prices for what they bought, not so high prices for what
57. Santa Fe New Mexican. October 11, 1918.
58. Ibid., November 13, 1918.
59. Ibid., November 14, 1918.
60. Questionnaire report, December 27, 1918.
61. M.'R. Johnston, Albuquerque, to [John W.] Hallowell (eb al.), Washington,
D. C., February 10, 1919, FA6HA14-3452.
62. Id. to id., January 17, 1919, ibid.
63. [John. W.] Hallowell, Washington, D. C., to M. R. Johnston, Albuquerque,
January 24, 1919,. (telegram copy), ibid.
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they sold. Menacingly as ever, the middleman seemed to
stand like a nemesis between producer and consumer. 1H For
the period of reconstruction that was to ·accompany the
return of peace, the Council of Defense and extension service
remained in active operation. Of the two the extension
service proved to be more active in long-range planning,
although the Council of Defense, which by September, 1918,
had expended $125,000 on agricultural development, carried
on some work until May, 1920. 65 There could be no doubt
that in spite of the war, New Mexico agriculture had made
great strides toward improved methods: great drainage
projects were well started in Dofia Ana and Bernalillo_
counties; more irrigation systems. were in operation; commercial fertilizers were being more largely used; legumes
were being plowed under; crop rotations were being planned;
controls were bein:g developed for soil blowing in dry farm
regions; pinto beans were being- standardized and raised
from hand-selected seed. These were only a few of the
many advances that the extension service fostered. 66 Other
groups were beginning to take a hand with the rema.ining
One of governor-elect 0. A. Larrazolo's ' first
problems.
.
acts was to send an invitation. to farmers and stockmen
of stricken districts for a '!fleeting where they might formulate recommendations for a recovery plan. 67 More belligerent
were farmers' associations, typical of which was the New
Mexican Bean Growers Association. Based upon the plan
of organization followed by the California fruit growers,
it frankly intended that measures should be taken "to insure
the growers that middlemen will not eat up the profits and
that they [the farmers] are not held up on necessaries for
production." 68 It was the beginning of a new era, in some
respects a disappointing era that would suffer from faulty
64. A. C. Cooley, Fourth Annual Repoo-t, p. 1; Santa Fe New Mexican, November
11, 1918.
'
65. · Ibid., October 11, 1917, September 18, 1918; Final Report New Mexico
Council of Defense, p. 7.
66. A. C. Cooley, Fourth Annual Report, pp. 33-34.
67. Santa Fe New Mexican, November 11, 1918.
68. Ibid., February 12, June 7, 1918; A. C. Cooley, Third Annnal Report, p. 28;
id., Fourth Annual Report, pp. 59-60; Albuquerque Morning Jour>'.d, October 12,
November 3, 1918.
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economic adjustments. But 1919 was to inaugurate it
auspiciously with plentiful rains and abundant crops. No
one could say it was not a deserved contrast for a people
that'had had the stamina to replant its fields twice, three
times, and even more in parched ground, and under a blistering sun. Such a people had needed nothing to remind them
of the duty of patriots. Even for those who recognized, as
a warning for a future wartime generation, that selfishness,
indifference, and corruption occasionally cropped out in th~
food effort, there were just as evident demonstrations of
optimism, courage, and faith~ll adequate guarantees of
future vitality.

